University of Chicago Law School

Chicago Unbound
Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics
Economics
2021

The Tax Gap's Many Shades of Gray
Daniel J. Hemel
Janet Holtzblatt
Steve Rosenthal

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/law_and_economics
Part of the Law Commons

Draft
The Tax Gap’s Many Shades of Gray
Daniel Hemel

University of Chicago Law School

Janet Holtzblatt

Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center

Steve Rosenthal

Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center

September 30, 2021
Abstract: The “tax gap”—the difference between the amount of “true tax” and the
amount of tax actually paid—has garnered widespread attention in recent months. Much of the
commentary on the subject equates the tax gap with “tax evasion,” a term broadly understood
to connote intentional (and potentially criminal) underreporting. This paper cautions against
conflating the tax gap with tax evasion. The tax gap includes substantial gray areas where the
law is ambiguous and the IRS’s determination of “true tax” is debatable. On top of that, the
IRS’s methodology for measuring the tax gap includes upward adjustments that are
recommended by front-line examiners but reversed on administrative appeal or judicial review.
Moreover, a substantial portion of the estimated tax gap is derived from a statistical technique
called “detection controlled estimation” that potentially magnifies the impact of later-reversed
recommendations on the ultimate tax gap measure. Weighing in the opposite direction, the
IRS’s approach to measuring the tax gap excludes some amounts that clearly constitute tax
evasion (most significantly, underreporting of tax on illegal-source income).
Understanding the tax gap’s shades of gray can inform discussions of tax law and policy.
We explain how proposals to use the tax gap as a performance target may produce perverse
incentives for the IRS. We further explain how additional IRS funding—though necessary to
improve the agency’s ability to enforce the tax laws—may have counterintuitive effects on the
estimates of the tax gap. We also illustrate—using examples from the taxation of passthrough
entities—how legislative reforms can reduce the size and scope of legal gray areas that
contribute to the tax gap. Our analysis highlights the importance of increased IRS funding levels
and substantive tax law changes as complementary strategies for improving tax compliance.
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Introduction
The “tax gap”—the difference between taxes owed to the government and taxes
actually collected—has gained new attention in recent months. In May 2021, the Treasury
Department projected that the gross tax gap—the difference between taxes owed and taxes
voluntarily and timely paid—totaled $630 billion in tax year 2019 (after “adjusting the tax gap
for passthrough and offshore evasion”).1 The net tax gap—which accounts for enforced and
other late payments—was still a staggering $554 billion in tax year 2019, according to
Treasury’s adjusted projection.2 The Biden administration’s “American Families Plan Tax
Compliance Agenda” aims to reduce the gross tax gap by roughly 10 percent over the next
decade.3 Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) and Representative Ro Khanna (D-Calif.) both
have introduced bills that would set an even more ambitious target, instructing the IRS to
reduce the net tax gap by at least one-third over the next 10 years.4
Notwithstanding its prominence, the “tax gap” is also a subject of considerable
confusion. In particular, the “tax gap” is frequently—and misleadingly—equated with “tax
evasion.” For example, the Biden administration’s May 2021 “American Families Plan Tax
Compliance Agenda” refers to the “tax gap” and “tax evasion” interchangeably.5 A recent essay
by five former Treasury secretaries outlining strategies to close the tax gap was titled, “We Ran
the Treasury Department. This Is How To Fix Tax Evasion.”6 News reports often lead with
provocative headlines that characterize the tax gap as a consequence of “cheating”—for
example, “The U.S. Is Losing $1 Trillion Annually to Tax Cheats” (New York Times7), and “IRS
Chief: Cheats are Costing U.S. $1 Trillion” (Washington Post8).
However, the “tax gap” as defined by the IRS, includes amounts that definitely do not
constitute “tax evasion”—at least in the legal sense of the term.9 Under federal law, tax evasion
1

See U.S. Department of the Treasury, The American Families Plan Tax Compliance Agenda 4-5 & tbl.1 (May 2021),
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/The-American-Families-Plan-Tax-Compliance-Agenda.pdf (hereinafter
“American Families Plan Tax Compliance Agenda”).
2
Id. at 4.
3
Id. at 2-3.
4
See Restoring the IRS Act, S. 1788, 117th Cong., 1st Sess. (May 24, 2021); Stop CHEATERS Act, H.R. 1200, 117
Cong., 1st Sess. (Feb. 22, 2021).
5
See, e.g., American Families Plan Tax Compliance Agenda, supra note 3, at 4 (referring to the IRS’s National
Research Program random audit studies as “the ‘gold standard’ for understanding tax evasion”). As explained
below, the NRP random audit studies generate estimates of the underreporting component of the tax gap but they
do not, and are not intended to, measure evasion.
6
See Timothy F. Geithner, Jacob J. Lew, Henry M. Paulson Jr., Robert E. Rubin & Lawrence H. Summers, N.Y. Times
(June 9, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/09/opinion/politics/irs-tax-evasion-geithner-lew-paulsonsummers-rubin.html. Both the headline and the text of the op-ed refer to the Biden administration’s tax gap
strategy as a way to “pursue evasion.” Id.
7
See Alan Rappeport, N.Y, Times (Apr. 13, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/live/2021/04/13/business/stockmarket-today.
8
See “IRS Chief: Cheats are Costing U.S. $1 Trillion,” Wash. Post (Apr. 13, 2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/irs-chief-says-cheats-are-costing-the-us-1-trillion-ayear/2021/04/13/128f1b0c-9c5d-11eb-b7a8-014b14aeb9e4_story.html.
9
See Statement of Nina Olson, Executive Director, Center for Taxpayer Rights, Before the Subcomm. on Taxation &
Oversight, S. Comm. on Finance 6 (May 11, 2021),
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is a felony involving a willful attempt to evade or defeat the assessment or payment of a tax.10
By contrast, the IRS’s definition of the tax gap includes all taxes that are underreported,
whether willfully or not. It includes instances in which taxpayers try to exploit ambiguities—
gray areas—in the tax code but are ultimately found by the IRS and the courts to be on the
wrong side even if their close-to-the-line conduct falls far short of criminality. It also includes
instances in which taxpayers make honest mistakes while trying to comply with ever-changing
and often-opaque tax laws.11 On top of that, the tax gap includes the liabilities of well-intended
taxpayers who acknowledge what they owe but are unable to pay due to financial distress. For
all these reasons, official IRS documents are generally careful not to characterize the tax gap as
“tax evasion”12 (though other sources—including other government sources13—often fail to
make the distinction).
The IRS’s methodology for estimating the tax gap generates a further wedge between
the tax gap and tax evasion. Several features of that methodology create the possibility that the
agency’s estimate of the tax gap will include amounts that a court—or even the IRS itself—
won’t ultimately deem the taxpayer to owe. The IRS’s measure of “true tax”—the starting point
for its calculation of both the gross and net tax gaps—includes any amount of additional tax
recommended by an examiner after an audit included in its compliance studies, even if the
examiner’s post-audit recommendation is subsequently reversed on administrative appeal or
court challenge. Data from the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA)
indicate that only 63 percent of additional taxes recommended by examiners in operational
audits in fiscal years 2015 through 2019 was ultimately assessed (after administrative appeals
and abatements).14 That figure is likely even lower after taking into account further reductions
on judicial review. Moreover, the IRS uses a method called “detection controlled estimation”
(DCE) in its compliance studies to scale up the recommendations of all examiners to the level of
the examiners who recommend the largest upward adjustments in types of personal income,
controlling for observable characteristics of the cases assigned to each examiner. The DCE
potentially magnifies the impact of later-reversed recommendations on the overall tax gap.
Cutting in the opposite direction, other features of the IRS’s methodology cause the
agency’s estimate of the tax gap to exclude amounts that are tax evasion by any definition. Of
particular note, the IRS’s tax gap estimates do not include underreporting attributable to illegal
https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/SFC%20Subcomm%20on%20Taxation%20and%20Oversight%20T
ax%20Gap%20-%20Olson%20-%2005-11-21%20(final)(rev)1.pdf.
10
I.R.C. § 7201; see Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343, 354 (1965).
11
See Gerald Auten & David Splinter, Comment: Tax Evasion at the Top of the Income Distribution: Theory and
Evidence 2 (Aug. 15, 2021), http://www.davidsplinter.com/AutenSplinter-TaxEvasion.pdf (noting that “the term
‘evasion’ … implies the criminal offense of intentionally failing to report income,” and recommending the use of
“the broader and more accurate terms underreporting and misreporting” when discussing the underreporting
component of the tax gap).
12
See, e.g., Internal Revenue Service, Federal Tax Compliance Research: Tax Gap Estimates for Tax Years 2011–
2013, Publication 1415 (Rev. 9-2019) (2019) (never using the term “evasion” in body text); .
13
See, e.g., U.S. Department of the Treasury, The Case for a Robust Attack on the Tax Gap (Sept. 7, 2021),
https://home.treasury.gov/news/featured-stories/the-case-for-a-robust-attack-on-the-tax-gap (using “tax gap”
and “tax evasion” interchangeably).
14
Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration, Trends in Compliance Activities Through Fiscal Year 2019, at
16 fig.6 (Mar. 12, 2021).
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source income.15 Taxpayers are required to report all of their income whether from legal or
illegal sources, and nearly two-thirds of all convictions for federal tax crimes involve illegal
source income.16 Nonetheless, the IRS says that it omits noncompliance attributable to illegal
source income from its tax gap estimates because (1) illegal source income is “extremely
difficult to estimate” and (2) “the government interest in pursuing this type of noncompliance
is, ultimately, to stop the illegal activity, not merely to tax it.”17 Below, we highlight additional
areas in which the IRS’s official estimates potentially omit significant amounts of
underreporting—including, but not limited, to tax evasion. For example, underreporting
attributable to passthrough entities such as partnerships and S corporations may be
understated in the agency’s official tax gap estimates because audits of those organizations are
not routinely conducted as part of the IRS compliance studies.
Equating the tax gap with tax evasion generates a distorted perception of the problem
of tax noncompliance. Between clear-cut noncompliance and compliance lies a spectrum of
different shades of gray, where taxpayers, the IRS, the courts, and Congress may disagree as to
what counts as legal or illegal. (Indeed, even within the IRS, there are often various views
among examiners and differences of opinion between examiners and appeals officers.)
Clarifying the contours of the tax gap not only provides a crisper picture of tax noncompliance
but also yields concrete policy implications. We highlight three implications in particular:
1. The tax gap should not be a performance target. The IRS’s tax gap research reveals
important sources of noncompliance and sheds light on the potential amounts of unpaid
taxes that could be collected under current law. But a goal such as reducing the tax gap by a
particular percentage aims at an amorphous target. Moreover, setting such a goal for the
IRS would produce potentially perverse incentives. For example, one easy way for the IRS to
reduce the measured tax gap would be to instruct examiners not to challenge aggressive
reporting positions adopted by sophisticated taxpayers who exploit legal gray areas. The IRS
would thereby reduce the amount of “true tax” owed—and thus the gap between “true
tax” and the amount actually paid. However, such measures would be at odds with the
goals of raising revenue and allocating tax burdens equitably.
2. The IRS needs skilled and experienced examiners and up-to-date technology to better
address the problem of tax noncompliance. If distinguishing between tax compliance and
noncompliance were simple, then the IRS could potentially rely on relatively inexperienced
examiners to detect underreporting of taxes. However, to the extent the tax gap results
from sophisticated taxpayers aggressively exploiting legal ambiguities, then the IRS’s task is
more challenging. Our analysis suggests that at least in certain areas—such as the taxation
of passthrough entities—noncompliance often takes the latter form. For example, rules
15

See Internal Revenue Service, Reducing the Federal Tax Gap: A Report on Improving Voluntary Compliance 6
(Aug. 2007), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/reducing_the_tax_gap.pdf (“It is important to emphasize that IRS
estimates of the tax gap are associated with the legal sector of the economy only.”); see also Kim M. Bloomquist,
IRS Office of Research, IRS Compliance Research and Tax Gap Estimates (Sept. 17, 2007),
https://www.taxadmin.org/assets/docs/Meetings/07rev_est/bloomquist.pdf (noting that illegal source income is
“not included in tax gap estimates”).
16
See IRS Data Book 2020, at 56 tbl.24.
17
See IRS, Reducing the Federal Tax Gap, supra note 15, at 6.
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regarding special allocations for partnerships and reasonable compensation for S
corporation shareholders involve complicated multi-part tests that are often unclear in their
application. In those circumstances, enforcement will be especially resource intensive and
will require a substantial boost in the IRS’s budget: the IRS will need to hire, train, and retain
revenue agents who are well-versed in the relevant areas of law and capable of conducting
complex audits, and it will need to support their efforts with 21st century technology. These
enforcement efforts may take a long time to pay off, especially when the taxpayer appeals
the examiner’s decision through the administrative process or takes the matter to the
courts.
3. Tackling the problem of tax noncompliance requires substantive legal reforms. Even the
most skilled and experienced examiners will struggle to enforce tax laws that are ambiguous
at their core. In those cases, audits are no substitute for clarity in the tax laws. We illustrate
this point primarily using examples involving passthrough entities (e.g., partnerships and S
corporations), for which the statutes on the books practically invite taxpayers to adopt
aggressive reporting positions—some challenged by examiners, some accepted as legal
avoidance strategies, and some that are never observed due to the rarity of audits at the
passthrough entity level. We propose straightforward revenue-raising reforms of the tax
rules that would make the IRS’s task much easier and would make enforcement more
equitable.
To be clear from the outset, the goal of this paper is not to determine whether Treasury
or the IRS has overestimated or underestimated the tax gap. Rather, our paper emphasizes that
the size of the tax gap is ultimately indeterminate. This indeterminacy is due in part to the fact
that noncompliance is difficult to observe. But it is also due to the fact that the tax laws are
often themselves indeterminate, and different observers (indeed, different officials within the
IRS) may disagree as to whether a particular taxpayer position is compliant or noncompliant.
The challenges of estimating the tax gap have led some tax authorities in other countries to
eschew the measure entirely.18 Our paper does not argue for such a step. Instead, we seek to
provide lawmakers, academics, advocates, and others with a clearer understanding of what tax
gap estimates do and do not signify so that they can use those estimates to improve tax policy.
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section I explains how the IRS defines and measures the
tax gap. Section II describes why the IRS’s official tax gap estimates may be overinclusive or
underinclusive of what taxpayers legally owe. Section III considers policy implications,
highlighting the need for additional IRS resources as well as substantive legal changes to
address areas of persistent noncompliance.
I.

What Is the Tax Gap?

18

For example, the Irish tax agency “does not estimate the tax gap because it has concerns both around accuracy
of estimation, and about the usefulness of a tax gap estimate at an operational level.” The agency “considers that
the science of estimating such a gap is insufficiently developed to provide a useful reliable estimate of tax noncompliance levels.” Comptroller & Auditor General, Report on the Accounts of the Public Services 2015, at 198
(Sept. 2016), https://www.rte.ie/documents/news/report-accounts-public-services-2015.pdf.
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Since 1964, the IRS has periodically conducted studies of tax noncompliance based, in part,
on samples of tax returns.19 This section focuses on the approach in the IRS’s most recent
completed tax gap study (for tax years 2011 through 2013). We also highlight the differences
between the IRS’s tax gap estimates and the legal and colloquial conceptions of “tax evasion.”
A. Defining the Tax Gap
The IRS defines the “gross tax gap” as “the amount of true tax that is not paid
voluntarily and timely.”20 The “net tax gap” is the gross tax gap minus amounts subsequently
paid. The difference between the gross tax gap and the net tax gap reflects (1) voluntary late
payments and (2) payments that result from enforcement activities.21 In its most recent study
of noncompliance, the IRS estimated that the gross tax gap was $441 billion per year for tax
years 2011 through 2013. Late payments and enforcement revenue reduced the annual tax gap
by $60 billion to $381 billion, on net. (See Table 1.)
The IRS uses its estimates of the gross and net tax gap to calculate the voluntary
compliance rate and the net compliance rate. The voluntary compliance rate is the amount of
taxes paid voluntarily and timely divided by the total “true” tax owed. The net compliance rate
is the amount of taxes ultimately paid divided by the total “true” tax. From 2011 through 2013,
the voluntary and net compliance rates were 83.6 percent and 85.8 percent, on average. (See
Table 1.) Remarkably, the IRS compliance rates have hovered around those levels for decades
(although the dollar amounts have grown).
The IRS divides the tax gap into three primary components: (1) the underreporting tax
gap, (2) the nonfiling tax gap, and (3) the underpayment tax gap. The underreporting tax gap is
the amount of understated taxes by taxpayers who file returns on time. The nonfiling tax gap is
the amount of unreported taxes by taxpayers who owe taxes but do not file a required return
on time (if at all). The underpayment tax gap is the amount of unpaid taxes reported on timely
filed returns. About 80 percent of the gross tax gap was attributable to underreporting, with
the remainder divided roughly in half between the other two sources of noncompliance.
B. Measuring the Tax Gap
Underreporting of the individual income tax and self-employment tax represents
roughly two-thirds of the IRS’s gross tax gap estimate.22 (See Table 2.) To estimate those
19

For history, see Internal Revenue Service, Estimates of Income Unreported on Individual Income Tax Returns,
Publication 1104 (Sept. 1979),
https://www.google.com/books/edition/Estimates_of_Income_Unreported_on_Indivi/cgIAeMYiJbYC?hl=en&gbpv
=1&pg=PA1&printsec=frontcover
20
See Internal Revenue Service, Federal Tax Compliance Research: Tax Gap Estimates for Tax Years 2011–2013,
Publication 1415 (Rev. 9-2019), at 1 (2019).
21
See id. at 1. Interest and penalty payments are excluded when deriving the net tax gap from the gross gap.
22
To estimate the corporate income tax underreporting gap, the IRS starts with operational audit results and
makes a series of adjustments to reflect the fact that returns chosen for operational audits are not a random
sample of the population of filers. See Publication 1415, supra note 20, at 21-23. As a recent report by the Joint
Committee on Taxation notes, “these techniques may not overcome all of the data limitations.” Staff of the Joint
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portions of the tax gap, the IRS uses results from National Research Program (NRP) audits,
supplemented by a method called detection controlled estimation (DCE).
National Research Program. The NRP starts with a stratified random sample of
individual income tax returns that are selected for audit.23 For the simplest returns, if the IRS
can reconcile reported amounts with information supplied by third parties (e.g., W-2s and
1099s) and there is no indication of any significant compliance issue, the IRS does not follow up
with the taxpayer. For somewhat more complicated returns, the IRS will conduct
correspondence audits that usually focus on just a few items on a tax return. For the most
complicated returns, the IRS will conduct a face-to-face interview with the taxpayer at an IRS
office or at the taxpayer’s home, place of business, or accountant’s office.24 At the end of the
audit, the examiner makes a recommendation (additional tax, no change, or a refund). That
recommendation is the foundation for the underreporting gap estimate.
Detection Controlled Estimation. NRP audits do not detect all instances of unreported
income. To estimate the amount of undetected income, the IRS uses a method called detection
controlled estimation (DCE). The basic idea behind DCE is that although the IRS cannot observe
true income, it can observe differences in recommended adjustments across examiners who
have audited returns involving similar tax issues with the same propensity for underreporting,
and it can use those differences to estimate how much is being missed by the less “successful”
examiners (i.e., examiners with a propensity to recommend lower adjustments for similar tax
returns).
For example, imagine that three NRP examiners named Daniel, Janet, and Steve audit
similar returns reporting income on Schedule C (profit or loss from a sole proprietorship). On
average, Daniel detects $1,000 of underreported self-employment income per Schedule C
examined; Janet detects $5,000; and Steve detects $10,000. The implicit assumption underlying
the DCE method is that Steve is the “best” of the three examiners and that both Daniel and
Committee on Taxation, JCX-30-21, Tax Gap: Overview of Federal Tax Provisions and Analysis of Selected Issues 6
(June 7, 2021). To estimate the portion of the employment tax underreporting gap associated with the Federal
Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) and Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA), the IRS uses compliance rates from
random audits conducted for tax years 2008 to 2010. See Publication 1415, supra note 20, at 23. The estate tax
underreporting gap is estimated through a mix of operational and random audits. See id. at 23-24.
The underpayment gap is largely estimated on the basis of administrative data reflecting past-due tax
balances. Estimation of the nonfiling gap raises a range of methodological challenges. Because the nonfiling gap is
a relatively small share of the gross tax gap (9 percent), we omit discussion here. For further treatment, see Brian
Erard, Mark Payne & Alan Plumley, Advances in Nonfiling Measures (Internal Revenue Service, Research Paper,
2012), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/12resconadvnonfile.pdf; and Brian Erard, Patrick Langetieg, Mark Payne &
Alan Plumley, Ghosts in the Income Tax Machinery (May 2, 2020), https://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/100036/1/MPRA_paper_100036.pdf.
23
Recent NRP studies have covered three-year spans, using approximately 14,000 individual income tax returns
per year. See Publication 1415, supra note 20, at 17.
24
See Publication 1415, supra note 20, at 17. Before any of the office and field audits, an experienced IRS examiner
reviews the file and “classifies” certain items for further investigation. The NRP examiner assigned to the return is
instructed to audit all classified items and also has discretion to audit unclassified items. Some items are routinely
classified: for example, Schedule C income (profit or loss from sole proprietorships) and Schedule F income (profit
or loss from farming). Items generally subject to third-party information reports (e.g., wages) are not routinely
classified.
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Janet would have detected $10,000 of underreported self-employment income per Schedule C
if they had been as skilled or conscientious as Steve. If Steve’s detection rate were perfect, then
Daniel’s determinations of underreported Schedule C income would be scaled up by a factor of
10, and Janet’s determinations would be scaled up by a factor of 2.25 The IRS then calculates the
additional taxes that should have been paid if taxpayers reported their DCE-adjusted income
and other corrected items on their tax returns.
The individual income tax underreporting gap thus includes (1) the recommended
additional tax at the end of NRP audits and (2) the amount of additional tax implied by the DCE
(scaled up to reflect the fact that the NRP captures only a small sample of the population). The
effect of the DCE approach on IRS estimates of the tax gap is large. For example, John Guyton
and coauthors report that the DCE approach effectively triples the average individual income
tax underreporting gap for tax years 2006 to 2013 (that is, for every $1 of noncompliance
detected by NRP audits, the DCE approach implies another $2 of undetected noncompliance).26
In other words, approximately two-thirds of the individual income tax underreporting gap is
attributable to the DCE. The accuracy of the DCE approach is therefore a central concern in tax
gap estimation.27
C. Distinguishing the Tax Gap and Tax Evasion
The “tax gap” encompasses much more than evasion. We focus first on the
underreporting component of the tax gap, and then the underpayment component of the tax
gap.
Reasons for Underreporting. The underreporting component of the tax gap, as
estimated by the IRS, encompasses any instance in which an examiner recommends additional
tax after a random audit. Underreporting sometimes reflects evasion, but it also can result from
a variety of other causes. For example, a taxpayer may make an unintentional mistake, ranging
from a misunderstanding of the law to forgetting to include a one-off payment for a few hours
25

In fact, the IRS makes a “very modest adjustment” to the determinations of the top examiners, on the
assumption that they uncovered “nearly all” noncompliance. Brian Erard & Jonathan Feinstein, The Individual
Income Reporting Gap: What We See and What We Don’t, IRS Research Bulletin: Proceedings of the 2011 IRS/TPC
Research Conference 129, 132 (2011), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/11resconindincome.pdf.
The IRS generates separate DCE estimates for different income categories. This allows for the possibility
that, for example, Janet is more likely than Steve to detect underreported Schedule C income and Steve is more
likely than Janet to detect underreported Schedule F income. In their study, Erard and Feinstein estimated implicit
average DCE multipliers range from 1.46 to 20.0 for different types of income, depending on the extent of
examiner-to-examiner variation. Id. at 140 tbl.1.
26
See, e.g., John Guyton, Patrick Langetieg, Daniel Reck, Max Risch & Gabriel Zucman, Tax Evasion at the Top of
the Income Distribution: Theory and Evidence 60 tbl.6. (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 28542,
Mar. 2021). Note that Guyton et al. use DCE multipliers from the 2001 NRP, which they then apply to returns from
the 2006-2013 NRPs. See id. at 10 n.14.
27
A DCE multiplier of approximately 3 is roughly consistent with estimates based on data from the Tax Compliance
Measurement Program (TCMP), the predecessor to the NRP. Using 1976 TCMP data, the IRS estimated that for
every $1 of underreported income detected by TCMP examiners without the help of third-party information
returns, another $2.28 of underreported income went undetected. See Naomi E. Feldman & Joel Slemrod,
Estimating Tax Noncompliance with Evidence from Unaudited Tax Returns, 117 Econ. J. 327, 330 (2007).
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of work. Likewise, an IRS examiner may make a mistake that is subsequently reversed on
supervisory review or appeal. In addition, a taxpayer and a revenue agent may disagree about
how confusing or ambiguous laws apply to particular factual circumstances, and those
disagreements over the gray areas of the tax code may spill over into the measurement of the
tax gap.
To illustrate the wide room for disagreement between taxpayers and revenue agents,
consider the following cases:
•

Valuation of illiquid assets. Taxpayers may be required to establish the fair market value of
illiquid assets in a variety of circumstances: for example, when partnership interests or
shares of private-company stock are transferred in connection with the performance of
services,28 sold to an IRA,29 or contributed to a public charity or donor-advised fund.30 In
those cases, valuation comes down largely to a “matter of opinion.”31 When a taxpayer and
an NRP examiner disagree about valuation, the disagreement becomes part of the
underreporting gap.32

•

Business vs. personal expenses. Taxpayers other than employees generally can deduct
ordinary and necessary business expenses but not expenses incurred for personal purposes.
For some items (e.g., meals and travel), the line between deductible and nondeductible
expenses is often, in the Tax Court’s words, “blurry.”33 For example, a taxpayer may take a
client who is also a friend out to dinner and discuss both business and personal matters; a
taxpayer may use a vehicle to pick up business supplies but drop off his child at school along
the way. The underreporting gap includes instances in which an NRP examiner disputes the
taxpayer’s claim that a particular expense was for the business.

•

Employee vs. independent contractor. A taxpayer’s status as an employee or a selfemployed independent contractor will matter for a range of tax-related reasons. For
example, independent contractors but not employees are potentially eligible for the 20
percent deduction for qualified business income under section 199A.34 Independent
contractors are eligible to set up their own solo 401(k)s and simplified employee pension
(SEP) plans, thus deferring up to $58,000 of income in 2021 ($64,500 if over the age of 50),
whereas employees are generally limited to the retirement savings options offered by their
employers. The IRS applies a 20-factor test (tracing back to a 1987 revenue ruling) to
determine whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor, though it
emphasizes that these factors “are designed only as guides” and “[t]he degree of
importance of each factor varies depending on the occupation and the factual context in

28

See I.R.C. § 83(a).
See I.R.C. § 4973, Notice 2004-8, 2004-1 C.B. 333.
30
See I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(C)(iv).
31
See Government Accountability Office, GAO-15-16, IRS Could Bolster Enforcement on Multimillion Dollar
Accounts, but More Direction from Congress Is Needed 50 (Oct. 2014).
32
Our main focus here is on the individual income tax underreporting gap, but it bears mention that valuation
disagreements play an especially significant role in the context of the estate tax underreporting gap.
33
Baca v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2019-78, 2019 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 81, at *12.
34
See I.R.C. § 199A(D)(B).
29
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which services are performed.”35 The underreporting gap includes instances in which a
taxpayer and an NRP examiner differ over the application of the 20-factor test to a
particular work arrangement.36
•

Partnership special allocations. The “most fundamental issue” in the taxation of
partnerships is the allocation of a partnership’s tax items.37 Partnerships have an incentive,
for example, to allocate ordinary-income items to tax-exempt partners and deductions and
long-term capital gains to partners in high tax brackets. A “special allocation”—an allocation
that is not in proportion to ownership interests—will not be respected by the IRS unless it
has a “substantial economic effect.”38 Commentators describe the regulations setting forth
this test as “infamously lengthy,” “inscrutable,” and “impossible-to-apply.”39 The
underreporting gap encompasses some instances in which a partnership has pushed the
special-allocation envelope too far.

•

Reasonable compensation. Wages paid by an S corporation to a shareholder-employee are
subject to employment tax, but non-wage distributions are not subject to employment or
self-employment tax (and are exempt from net investment income tax if the shareholder
materially participates in the business).40 Active shareholders of S corporations therefore
have a strong incentive to pay themselves low wages and to take large non-wage
distributions.41 However, a 1974 revenue ruling requires S corporations to pay their active
shareholders “reasonable compensation for services performed.”42 As the IRS has noted,
“[t]here are no specific guidelines for reasonable compensation in the Code or the
Regulations.”43 The IRS and the courts generally rely on a nine-factor test, but no single
factor is decisive.44 When a taxpayer and an NRP examiner disagree on what constitutes
“reasonable compensation,” the disagreement adds to the underreporting gap.45

35

Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296.
We focus in the text on circumstances in which self-employment provides tax advantages for a worker. There
are, to be sure, some tax disadvantages of self-employment (e.g., self-employed individuals cannot deduct health
insurance costs for self-employment tax purposes, see I.R.C. § 162(l), whereas employees can exclude employersponsored health insurance costs from Federal Insurance Contributions Act wages). And workers who take on
independent-contractor status in order to gain the tax advantages of self-employment potentially suffer non-tax
consequences, such as the loss of labor-law and employment-discrimination protections. Indeed, many workers
may have to choose between being classified as an independent contractor or being unemployed, because of the
advantages to their employers.
37
Gregg D. Polsky, Deterring Tax-Driven Partnership Allocations, 64 Tax Lawyer 97, 97 (2010).
38
Treas. Reg. 1.704-1(b)(2).
39
See Emily Cauble & Gregg D. Polsky, The Problem of Abusive Related-Partner Allocations, 16 Fla. Tax Rev. 479,
482 (2014).
40
I.R.C. § 1411(c)(4).
41
The new section 199A qualified business income deduction, which postdates the IRS’s latest tax gap study,
supersizes the incentive for active S corporation shareholders to understate their own salaries because S
corporation shareholders can claim the 20 percent deduction for distributions but not for “reasonable
compensation.” I.R.C. § 199A(c)(4)(A).
42
Rev. Rul. 74-44, 1974-1 C.B. 287.
43
Internal Revenue Service, FS-2008-25, Fact Sheet: Wage Compensation for S Corporation Officers 2 (Aug. 2008).
44
See Owensby & Kritikos, Inc. v. Commissioner, 819 F.2d 1315, 1323 (5th Cir. 1987).
45
A similar issue arises in the partnership context. The definition of “net earnings from self-employment income”
for purposes of the self-employment tax specifically excludes “the distributive share of any item of income or loss
36
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To be sure, complicated and ambiguous laws can affect the underreporting gap in both
directions, especially when the IRS is constrained by limited resources. Even the examiners who
are most likely to recommend an upward adjustment may decline to do so when they lack the
time, budget, and institutional support to contend with sophisticated and well-compensated
tax lawyers. Hence the tax gap may exclude some instances where a better-resourced examiner
would have concluded that the taxpayer’s position was not supported by the facts and
circumstances and thus should have been included in the tax gap.
Reasons for Underpayment. A tax debt may remain unpaid for a variety of reasons, in
addition to taxpayers willfully refusing to pay even the taxes they report on their tax returns.
Congress has instructed the IRS—when settling tax debts—to ensure that taxpayers “have an
adequate means to provide for basic living expenses.”46 Congress also requires the IRS to
release a levy (i.e., a legal seizure of property, such as the garnishment of wages) when the levy
“is creating an economic hardship due to the financial condition of the taxpayer.”47 Moreover,
tax debts are dischargeable in bankruptcy absent unusual circumstances,48 and tax debts
exceeding the value of a decedent’s estate generally cannot be collected from her heirs. Clearly,
not all people with unpaid tax debts are tax evaders. Some are just poor, bankrupt, or dead.49
of a limited partner, as such, other than guaranteed payments … to that partner for services actually rendered to
or on behalf of the partnership to the extent that those payments are established to be in the nature of
remuneration for those services.” I.R.C. § 1402(a)(13). This raises the question: Can a limited partner who provides
services to the partnership receive reasonable compensation, in the form of a guaranteed payment, for services to
the partnership and then claim exemption from self-employment tax for her distributive share of partnership
profits?
Treasury and the IRS issued proposed regulations in 1997 that treat all partners as general partners for
self-employment tax purposes if they participate in the partnership’s trade or business for more than 500 hours
during the partnership’s taxable year. See Prop. Treas. Reg. 1.1402(a)-2(h)(2)(iii), 62 Fed. Reg. 1702, 1704 (Jan. 13,
1997). Although the IRS has not finalized the proposed regulations, the Tax Court has adopted the proposed
regulation’s view. See Renkemeyer, Campbell & Weaver, LLP v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 137, 150 (2011) (“The
legislative history of section 1402(a)(13) does not support a holding that Congress contemplated excluding
partners who performed services for a partnership in their capacity as partners (i.e., acting in the manner of selfemployed persons), from liability for self-employment taxes.”). The result in Renkemeyer has drawn criticism from
practitioners. See, e.g., James R. Browne, Can LLC Members Avoid Self-Employment Tax on LLC Profits?, 171 Tax
Notes Federal 725 (May 3, 2021) (arguing that limited partners and LLC managing members are exempt from selfemployment tax on distributive-share income over and above reasonable compensation). Treasury under the
Obama administration acknowledged that the issue was ambiguous. See U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, General
Explanations of the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2017 Revenue Proposals 169 (Feb. 2016),
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/general-Explanations-FY2017.pdf. The FY 2022
Greenbook notes that “[s]ome partners who might more accurately be considered general partners and some LLC
members avoid SECA by claiming the treatment of limited partners.” U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, General
Explanations of the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2022 Revenue Proposals 65 (May 2021),
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/131/General-Explanations-FY2022.pdf.
46
I.R.C. § 7122(d)(2)(A).
47
I.R.C. § 6343(a)(1)(D).
48
Exceptions apply in cases of tax fraud and tax evasion. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(C).
49
See Statement of Nina Olson, supra note 9, at 7 (“Are the taxpayers who failed to make tax payments during this
period tax evaders and tax cheats because their businesses shut down or went under during this period, or
because they lost their jobs?”).
According to a March 2021 report by the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration,
approximately $38.5 billion of unpaid individual income tax liabilities as of May 2019 were attributable to “high-
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***
In sum, the tax gap can be viewed as a rough gauge of how far we are from a world in
which everyone pays their taxes in full. But measuring what the IRS claims is legally owed is
challenging.
II. Official Tax Gap Estimates May be Too High—or Too Low
As noted above, the IRS’s latest tax gap estimates date to tax years 2011 through 2013.
For those tax years, the IRS estimates a gross tax gap of $441 billion per year, on average.50 The
Treasury Department recently projected that if the tax gap grew with overall income since then,
the gross tax gap would have reached $584 billion by tax year 2019.51 Treasury supplemented
that number with an “adjusted” projection putting the gross tax gap for tax year 2019 at $630
billion. (See Table 3.) The higher figure is based on estimates in a paper by John Guyton and
coauthors arguing that the official tax gap omits a significant amount of underreporting
attributable to passthrough entities and offshore investments.52
Official estimates of the size of the tax gap may err in either direction—overstating or
understating the amount that taxpayers legally owe but don’t pay. With the caveat that the
“true” tax gap ultimately depends upon contestable determinations of tax liability, we review
here potential sources of upward and downward bias.
A. Reasons Why Official Estimates Might Be Too High
There are at least four reasons why the official estimates of the tax gap may overstate
the actual amount of unpaid taxes.
1. Recommended Additional Tax vs. True Tax. The IRS defines the tax gap as the
difference between the amount of “true tax” and the amount of tax actually paid on time, but
its estimate of the largest portion of the tax gap—the individual income tax underreporting
gap—is based on the recommended additional tax after an NRP random audit. Especially when
tax laws and taxpayers’ circumstances are complicated, the amount of “true tax” often lies in

income taxpayers,” defined as taxpayers who reported an adjusted gross income (AGI) of $200,000 or more on at
least one Form 1040 over a five-year span. Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration, High-Income
Taxpayers Who Owe Delinquent Taxes Could Be More Effectively Prioritized 4 (Mar. 10, 2021). While this suggests
that not all underpayment reflects inability to pay, note that the $38.5 billion figure is cumulative of all delinquent
tax liabilities (the statute of limitations for collection of a tax debt is 10 years). High-income taxpayers, as defined
by TIGTA, accounted for only 22 percent of all delinquent tax liabilities. See id.
50
See Publication 1415, supra note 20, at 8.
51
American Families Plan Tax Compliance Agenda, supra note 3, at 4 tbl.1. Treasury supplemented that number
with an “adjusted” projection putting the gap for tax year 2019 at $630 billion, based on estimates in a paper by
Guyton et al. arguing that the official tax gap omits a significant amount of offshore evasion and passthrough
underreporting. Id. (citing Guyton et al., supra note 26, at 21).
52
Id. (citing Guyton et al., supra note 26, at 21).
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the eyes of the beholder. To the extent NRP data reflect the examiner’s excessively strict
interpretation of a tax provision, the NRP estimates of true tax may be overstated.
We know from non-random operational audits that the examiner’s recommendation
can be revised downward on supervisory review or administrative appeal—especially in audits
of business tax returns.53 According to the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration
(TIGTA), only 70 percent of the additional tax (or credit reduction) recommended by an
examiner in a case closed in fiscal years 2015 through 2019 by the IRS’s Small Business/SelfEmployment Division was assessed (net of abatements) after supervisory review or
administrative appeal.54 (Inclusive of all individual and corporate tax returns, that ratio drops to
63 percent—largely driven by the very high rate of successful challenges by large businesses.)
And TIGTA’s figures do not account for cases in which a taxpayer prevails against the IRS in Tax
Court or obtains a refund in a lawsuit filed in federal district court or the Court of Federal
Claims.
To be sure, the fact that an IRS appeals officer reduces an adjustment does not always
mean that the examiner made a mistake. Unlike examiners and supervisors, the IRS Office of
Appeals is empowered to consider the hazards and costs of litigation as well as the merits of
the case.55 The appeals officer thus may reduce the recommended assessment even though she
agrees with the examiner on the merits (e.g., because she thinks that a court would likely see
the matter differently). The key point for present purposes is that “true tax” lies in the eyes of
the beholder, and NRP data reflect a particular perspective (that of the examiner).
Compare how tax practitioners typically approach uncertain tax positions. In
anticipation of disputes between clients and the IRS, lawyers measure uncertain tax positions in
shades of gray. When providing tax opinions to clients, many lawyers rank the probability that a
taxpayer’s position will prevail by using opinion standards like the following:
• “Not frivolous”: 10 to 20 percent;
• “Reasonable basis”: 33 percent;
• “Substantial authority”: 40 percent;
• “More likely than not”: at least 50 percent;
53

It is not clear whether or how NRP data account for adjustments on supervisory review. The Internal Revenue
Manual states that “[q]uality review throughout the NRP process will ensure that high-quality data are collected.”
Internal Revenue Manual 4.22.1.3(5) (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.irs.gov/irm/part4/irm_04-022-001. But we are
unaware of any IRS document that explains how these quality reviews are conducted or how NRP data are
adjusted in light of these quality reviews.
54
Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration, Trends in Compliance Activities Through Fiscal Year 2019, at
16 fig.6 (Mar. 12, 2021). The TIGTA data reflects the results of all audits, not only NRP audits of individual income
tax returns. The share of recommended amount that is ultimately assessed varies substantially depending on the
type of taxpayer: 94 percent for individual income tax returns without any business income, 70 percent for tax
returns with income from corporate and noncorporate businesses with less than $10 million of assets, and 54
percent for individual and corporate tax returns examined by the Large Business and International Division, which
is responsible for audits of businesses with over $10 million of assets and high-wealth individuals. We lack any
strong basis for believing that those figures would be significantly different for the random tax audits included in
the IRS’s estimates of the tax gap.
55
Treas. Reg. § 601.106(f)(2)
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• “Should”: at least 60 percent; and
• “Will”: at least 90 percent.56
Similarly, accountants use probabilities to disclose, and reserve for, uncertain tax position in
financial statements, pursuant to Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Interpretation
No. 48 (FIN 48).57
As the tax opinion and accounting standards illustrate, practitioners measure tax
positions in degrees of uncertainty, not in binary categories of noncompliance or compliance.
The “true tax” construct underlying the IRS’s tax gap estimates seeks to collapse these shades
of gray into categories of black and white.
2. Examiner Accuracy vs. Examiner Aggressiveness. In order to estimate the tax gap
from NRP audits, the DCE approach “scales up” recommended additional tax to the level of the
examiners who detect the largest amount of an underreported income type, given comparable
incidences and amounts of underreporting across those returns. In the example above, Steve’s
recommendation of $10,000 of underreported income per Schedule C is taken as true, and
Daniel’s and Janet’s lower recommendations are multiplied to roughly equal Steve’s. But this
scaling-up raises an important concern: What if Steve is simply more aggressive than Daniel and
Janet, recommending adjustments that Daniel and Janet would deem to be unwarranted?
The combination of (a) using recommended additional tax rather than tax assessed after
administrative or judicial appeals, and (b) scaling up everyone else’s recommendations to the
additional tax recommended by Steve raises the risk that the DCE adjustment is reflecting
something other than the fact that Steve is “better” at detecting unreported income.58 As a
result, the DCE multiplier may effectively amplify an improper adjustment. This risk is especially
concerning because two-thirds of the individual income tax underreporting gap is attributable
to the DCE scale-up.59
56

See Robert W. Wood, The Uneasy Topic of Tax Opinion Standards, Tax Notes Federal, Dec. 16, 2019, at 1823.
Lawyers must assume that the IRS will examine their clients’ uncertain positions. See id. at 1823-24 (noting that
“an opinion’s conclusion can’t be based on the audit lottery”).
57
Financial Accounting Standards Board, Summary of Interpretation No. 48 (2006)
https://www.fasb.org/summary/finsum48.shtml. FIN 48 now is mostly codified at Financial Accounting Standards
Board, Accounting Standards Codification 740-10 (updated Dec. 2019),
https://asc.fasb.org/imageRoot/55/121964355.pdf
58
The academic article that provides the intellectual foundation for the DCE method acknowledges this issue. See
Jonathan S. Feinstein, An Econometric Analysis of Income Tax Evasion and Its Detection, 22 RAND J. Econ. 14, 18
(1991) (“[N]o possibility of false detection is allowed, in which an examiner falsely claims to detect evasion when
none is present. This assumption accords with IRS ‘folklore,’ but it would be interesting to investigate the
importance of this assumption to the findings obtained.”).
59
A further concern regarding the DCE adjustment relates to the possibility that examiner-to-examiner differences
might reflect noise in the data. It’s possible that the examiners with the highest propensity to recommend
adjustments were randomly assigned to less compliant taxpayers. The IRS addresses this in part by controlling for
taxpayer and tax return characteristics when estimating the DCE equation. Erard & Feinstein, supra note 20, at
134. But those controls are unlikely to capture all non-examiner sources of variation. Thus there remains a risk of
“overfitting” (i.e., attributing differences to examiners that really results from other causes).
Analysts can use a variety of tools to evaluate the extent of overfitting. One approach is out-of-sample
validation: the IRS could calculate DCE multipliers based on (for example) half of each examiner’s audits and test to
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In sum, official tax gap estimates do not reflect the amount of additional tax that
examiners, on average, would recommend after audit. They reflect the amount of additional
tax that would be recommended if all returns were audited by the examiners with the highest
propensity to recommend upward adjustments (ignoring downward adjustments that might
then occur in the appeals process). The IRS’s official tax gap estimates thus potentially include
positions to which even a cautious tax practitioner would give a “more likely than not” or
“should” opinion.
3. Asymmetric Treatment of Overreporting and Underreporting. A third source of
potential upward bias in IRS tax gap estimates relates to the treatment of overreporting. Since
the underreporting gap is the difference between “true tax” (as determined by the IRS) and the
amount actually paid, overreported amounts ought to be netted against underreported
amounts. The IRS recognizes this logic, and accordingly, NRP examiners are instructed to look
for cases of overreporting. However, only underreported amounts are scaled up via the DCE
method; overreported amounts are not. The implicit assumption is that NRP audits catch only a
fraction of underreporting but all overreporting.60
The assumption that NRP audits detect all overreporting is certainly open to question.
Recall that some NRP audits are completed on a no-contact or correspondence basis. It is highly
unlikely that those audits would catch, for example, a child or other dependent in a household
who would entitle a taxpayer to an additional credit. As Eric Toder observes, “one might
suspect that IRS examiners are not over-zealous in searching for and finding unclaimed tax
benefits.”61 When overreporting goes undetected in random audits, the IRS’s official tax gap
estimates will be inflated.
4. Post-2013 Changes in Law. The IRS’s official tax gap estimate, by design, is based on
the laws in effect for tax years 2011 through 2013. Changes in tax law since 2013 alter the “true
tax” baseline and thus the resulting tax gap.
For example, the 20 percent deduction for qualified business income under section
199A, introduced in December 2017 by the law commonly known as the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act
(TCJA),62 significantly reduced the effective tax rate for most sole-proprietor income (as well as
some partnership and S corporation income, rents, and royalties). If compliance rates remain
constant, reducing the amount of “true tax” that sole proprietors owe will mechanically reduce

see whether these multipliers predict outcomes in the other half of audits. However, the IRS’s tax gap reports do
not explain which method (if any) the agency uses to address overfitting.
60
Erard & Feinstein, supra note 25, at 142; James Alm & Brian Erard, Using Public Information to Estimate SelfEmployment Earnings of Informal Suppliers 17 n.23 (Tulane Univ., Tulane Economics Working Paper Series,
Working Paper No. 1517, July 2015), http://repec.tulane.edu/RePEc/pdf/tul1517.pdf.
61
Eric Toder, What Is the Tax Gap?, Tax Notes, Oct. 22, 2007, at 1, 7.
62
An Act to Provide for Reconciliation Pursuant to Titles II and V of the Concurrent Resolution on the Budget for
Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017). On the origins of the law’s lengthy official title, see
Naomi Jagoda, Senate Parliamentarian Rules Against GOP Tax Bill’s Name, The Hill (Dec. 19, 2017),
https://thehill.com/policy/finance/365691-senate-parliamentarian-rules-against-gop-tax-bills-name.
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the tax gap.63 Weighing in the other direction, TCJA’s inclusion of section 199A creates a new
set of compliance issues surrounding the definition of a “specified service” for which the
deduction is limited64 and the reasonable-compensation standard for S corporation
shareholders claiming the deduction.65
TCJA also increased the standard deduction and capped the popular itemized
deductions for home mortgage interest and state and local taxes. In combination, those
changes resulted in significantly more taxpayers claiming the standard deduction rather than
itemized deductions.66 The IRS attributes $20 billion of the 2011-2013 tax gap to nonbusiness
“adjustments, deductions, exemptions.”67 That component of the tax gap is likely to shrink as
more taxpayers claim the standard deduction.68
Finally, the December 2017 tax law reduced the tax rate on C corporations from 35
percent to 21 percent. As with section 199A, reducing “true tax” on corporations mechanically
reduces the tax gap. Moreover, reductions in the effective tax rate may increase compliance.69
For example, TCJA’s corporate rate reduction made it much less profitable for corporations to
underreport income. Given the lags and challenges in compliance research, we may not know
for years—if ever—the direction or the extent of TCJA’s effect on compliance behavior.
B. Reasons Why Official Estimates Might Be Too Low
The issues above all relate to reasons why the IRS’s official tax gap estimates may be
overstated or why the tax gap may have declined in real terms since 2011 to 2013. In its May
2021 report, the Treasury Department estimated that the gross tax gap in 2019 could be as high
as $630 billion after accounting for underreporting of income from passthrough entities and
offshore evasion—$46 billion higher than if the gap had grown apace with income since the
most recent IRS study.70 IRS Commissioner Charles Rettig suggested that the real tax gap could
be much higher—in excess of $1 trillion per year “for tax years going forward.”71 Rettig cited

63

Weighing in the other direction, the existence of section 199A creates a new set of compliance issues
surrounding the definition of a “specified service” for which the deduction is limited, see I.R.C. § 199A(d)(2), and
the reasonable-compensation standard for S corporation shareholders claiming the deduction, see I.R.C. §
199A(c)(4).
64
See I.R.C. § 199A(d)(2).
65
See I.R.C. § 199A(c)(4).
66
The share of individual income tax returns claiming the standard deduction rose from 68 percent for tax year
2017 to 87 percent for tax year 2018. Compare Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income Division, Publication
1304, at tbl. 1.2 (Sept. 2019), with Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income Division, Publication 1304, at tbl.
1.2 (Sept. 2020).
67
See Publication 1415, supra note 20, at 20 tbl.5.
68
The December 2017 tax law also temporarily suspended personal exemptions. See I.R.C. § 151(d)(5). However, in
light of the partially offsetting increase in the child tax credit and the introduction of a new dependent credit, the
net effect on the tax gap is ambiguous.
69
See Michael G. Allingham & Agnar Sandmo, Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis, 1 J. Pub. Econ. 323, 330
(1972).
70
American Families Plan Tax Compliance Agenda, supra note 3, at 4 tbl.1.
71
Charles Rettig, Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service, A Closer Look: Impacting the Tax Gap (May 2021),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/foia/ig/cl/tax-gap-for-web.pdf; see Alan Rappeport, Tax Cheats Cost the U.S. $1 Trillion
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four types of underreporting that the IRS’s latest tax gap estimates might be missing:
underreporting attributable to passthroughs and offshore evasion (as echoed by the Treasury
report) plus underreporting attributable to cryptocurrency and illegal activities. We elaborate
on each in turn.
1. Passthrough Income. The most recent IRS tax gap report (for tax years 2011 through
2013) estimated that the underreporting rate for all passthrough income (including
partnerships, S corporations, estates, and trusts) was only 11 percent,72 down from 16 percent
for tax years 2008 through 2010.73 The IRS tax gap reports do not provide separate estimates of
underreporting by partnerships, S corporations, estates, or trusts. However, Treasury’s adjusted
projection of the tax gap in its May 2021 report—which tracks Guyton et al.’s estimate—adds
more than $20 billion of underreported tax attributable solely to passthrough income.74
We share Guyton et al.’s concern that NRP audit results might understate passthrough
underreporting. The two-level structure of passthrough income reporting poses a serious
challenge for NRP examiners. Partnerships and S corporations first file entity-level returns,
which report the entity’s net income and other tax items.75 Partners and S corporation
shareholders then file individual income tax returns, on which they report their share of the
entity’s income and other tax items. Underreporting may occur at either level—on the entity’s
return or on the partners’ and shareholders’ individual income tax returns. However, in recent
NRP studies, only the individual income tax returns were included in the set of returns
randomly selected for audit—entity-level returns were not.76 In some cases, the NRP examiner
assigned to the individual income tax return of a partner or S corporation shareholder may have
audited the partnership or S corporation as part of the review process.77 Still, the set of entity-

per Year, I.R.S Chief Says, N.Y. Times (Apr. 13, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/13/business/irs-taxgap.html.
72
See Publication 1415, supra note 20, at 20 tbl.5
73
See Internal Revenue Service, Federal Tax Compliance Research: Tax Gap Estimates for Tax Years 2008–2010, at
18 tbl.6 (2016), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/p1415.pdf.
74
In its adjusted tax gap projection for tax year 2019, Treasury added $46 billion of underreported tax attributable
to passthroughs and offshore underreporting (on top of its base projection updating the IRS’s 2011-2013 data for
subsequent income growth). Treasury did not explain how much of the $46 billion was attributable to
passthroughs versus offshore income. However, Treasury noted that the amount was computed by adjusting
Guyton et al.’s estimates for post-2012 income growth. See American Families Plan Tax Compliance Agenda, supra
note 3, at 4 tbl.1 n.2. Slightly more than half of Guyton et al.’s addition to the IRS’s estimate appears to be
attributable to passthrough underreporting. Compare Guyton et al., supra note, at 21 ($15 billion in underreported
taxes attributable to offshore accounts), with id. at 60 tbl.A6 ($33 billion of underreported tax not included in IRS’s
DCE-corrected estimate).
75
Partnerships and S corporations do not pay entity-level taxes on their income; instead, the businesses pass their
income through to the owners, who are responsible for paying income taxes on their share of the business’s net
income.
76
See Auten & Splinter, supra note 11, at 11. The IRS last conducted a random audit study of partnerships in 1982
and a small-scale random audit pilot study of S corporations in 2003-2004.
77
Indeed, according to Guyton et al., 57.6 percent of all underreporting of partnership and S corporation income
detected in NRP audits from 2006 through 2013 resulted from examinations of some entities associated with some
owners in the sample. Guyton et al., supra note 26, at 28 n.36.
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level returns that were examined in recent NRP studies are not representative of all such
returns.78
In theory, the DCE adjustments reflected in recent IRS tax gap studies may account for
the fact that examiners only sometimes review entity-level returns when auditing individual
partners or S corporation shareholders. If the most “successful” examiners routinely conduct
entity-level audits as part of their review of individual returns, then other examiners’ estimates
will be scaled up accordingly. However, even the most skilled examiners are likely to overlook
substantial amounts of underreporting in partnership-level audits, and the examined entities
are not representative of all passthrough entities. As a recent Joint Committee on Taxation
report summarizes, “the flow-through nature of the partnerships and the frequently multitiered structure of partnerships … renders it difficult to determine whether income has been
properly reported by the ultimate beneficial owner of the income.”79 Note that this issue is
more severe for partnerships than for S corporations: S corporations by law must have much
simpler structures and are limited to one class of stock.80
Ultimately, estimating the underreporting gap for passthrough entities raises the same
difficulty emphasized throughout this paper: the size of the gap is uncertain because the
amount of “true tax” is itself uncertain. Many of the passthrough tax laws—and in particular,
the rules for partnerships in subchapter K—are shrouded in ambiguity. The partnership special
allocation issue noted above is one example, but far from the only one. As Professor Lawrence
Lokken summarized the state of affairs two decades ago:
Subchapter K is a mess. … [It] is a system of such complexity that full compliance is only
theoretically possible. … Taxpayers and tax advisers who want to comply account for
partnership transactions in ways that are consistent with their conceptions of the basic
aims of subchapter K; others account as adventurously as they believe the IRS is likely to
tolerate. IRS auditors challenge partnership accounting only if it seems to be seriously
out of whack. No one has the ability, resources, and incentive to figure out

78

See Auten & Splinter, supra note 11, at 11 (suggesting that entity-level returns that were audited in recent NRP
studies “corresponded to the taxpayer having the business records,” and thus “were likely to be smaller, singleowner businesses where the owner could control both entity-level and individual reporting”). Note that a
nonrepresentative sample of entity-level returns, when combined with the DCE adjustment, could lead to bias in
either direction.
79
JCX-30-21, supra note 22, at 52.
80
I.R.C. § 1361(b). Events and trends since tax years 2011 through 2013 (the years reflected in the most recent IRS
tax gap estimates) could affect the passthrough underreporting gap in either direction. On the one hand, the
entity-level audit rate for partnerships and S corporations has declined—from 0.4 percent in fiscal year 2013 to 0.2
percent in fiscal year 2019. See IRS Data Book 2013, at 22 tbl.9a; IRS Data Book 2019, at 45 tbl.17b. The declining
audit rate may have resulted in weaker deterrence and therefore lower passthrough compliance. On the other
hand, Congress attempted to curb the incentive for partnerships to underreport income by tightening audit rules
for large partnerships in the Bipartisan Balanced Budget Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-74, § 1101, 129 Stat. 584,
625. Under the new rules, the IRS generally assesses and collects any understatement of tax at the partnership
level, which the partnership divides among current partners. It is unclear whether any positive effect on
compliance from the 2015 changes outweighs the potentially negative effect on compliance from declining audit
rates.
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exactly what the rules require.81
What we can say with confidence is that passthrough noncompliance poses a first-order
problem for the federal income tax system. The IRS’s last tax gap report put the portion of the
gross tax gap attributable to passthrough entities at $19 billion for tax years 2011 through
2013.82 This is a substantial sum, and the actual total may be higher. We return to this issue in
Section III.C, where we highlight steps that Congress can take to reduce this portion of the tax
gap.
2. Offshore Income. The IRS’s tax gap reports do not distinguish between
underreporting of income earned in the United States and income from economic activities
abroad, but random audit studies may not fully reflect noncompliance attributable to offshore
income. The Treasury Department, in its May 2021 report, adds roughly $20 billion to the
official tax gap to account for its estimate of additional underreporting of foreign income to the
IRS in 2019. As with the adjustment for passthrough income, the department bases its
projection on the study by Guyton et al.83 And as with the passthrough adjustment,
Commissioner Rettig also cited that study as another reason why the tax gap may be as much
as $1 trillion.84
Monitoring taxpayers’ income from investments and activities in foreign countries
presents several challenges that could result in an undercount of offshore noncompliance.
Historically, some U.S. citizens have taken advantage of privacy laws in certain countries, such
as Switzerland, that allowed them to shield their assets in secret bank accounts. In other
instances, U.S. citizens—including some who were born and lived their entire life in another
country—hold accounts in the foreign banks closest to where they live rather than in distant
U.S. financial institutions. Prior to 2014, foreign financial institutions did not typically file
information returns with the IRS, and the lack of data likely impeded the agency’s efforts to
detect noncompliance. And it may be difficult for examiners to disentangle the finances of
multinational enterprises that shift funds within a complex network of foreign and domestic
entities. The last issue primarily affects the corporate income tax underreporting gap, but it also
may affect large partnerships with foreign affiliates.
Guyton et al. estimate that U.S. households held approximately $1.058 trillion in
offshore wealth in 2007 and concealed 95 percent of that wealth from the IRS.85 Their estimate
of the concealment rate is based on sources suggesting that between 88 and 95 percent of U.S.
clients’ accounts in Swiss branches of Credit Suisse and UBS were not declared to the IRS in the
mid-2000s.86 Guyton et al. take the number at the high end of that range (95 percent) and apply
81

Lawrence Lokken, Taxation of Private Business Firms: Imagining a Future Without Subchapter K, 4 Fla. Tax Rev.
249, 250-52 (1999).
82
Publication 1415, supra note 20, at 20 tbl.5.
83
See American Families Plan Tax Compliance Agenda, supra note 3, at 4 tbl.1 n.2 (citing Guyton et al., supra note
26).
84
Rettig, supra note 71, at 3.
85
Guyton et al., supra note 26, at 20 & tbl.1.
86
Guyton et al. cite two Senate subcommittee reports which—according to Guyton et al.—“found that 90 percent95 percent of the wealth held by American clients of a number of Swiss banks were undeclared” before 2010. Id. at
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it uniformly to their estimates of offshore wealth in all countries.87 They further estimate that
U.S. households failed to pay approximately $15 billion in taxes on interest, dividends, and
capital gains attributable to those offshore holdings assumed to be concealed.88 They observe
that underreported tax attributable to offshore underreporting is “almost never detected by
NRP auditors.”89
The Treasury Department accepts the $15 billion figure and projects an “adjusted” tax
gap for tax year 2019 based on the premise that offshore evasion increased in step with income
growth (by type of income).90 Setting aside any concerns about the $15 billion figure as an
estimate for 2007,91 there are strong reasons to believe that offshore underreporting by U.S.

20. One of those reports cites internal UBS documents indicating that approximately 88 pecent of assets in U.S.
clients’ Swiss accounts in 2005 were not declared to the IRS. Tax Haven Banks and U.S. Tax Compliance: Hearings
Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs,
110th Cong. 88 (2008), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-110shrg44127/pdf/CHRG-110shrg44127.pdf
(“In October 2005, for example, the data indicate a total of about 18.5 billion Swiss francs of assets in the
undeclared accounts and 2.6 billion Swiss francs in the declared accounts”). The other states that “between 85%
and 95%” of Swiss accounts opened for U.S. customers at Credit Suisse “may have been hidden from U.S. tax
authorities.” Offshore Tax Evasion: The Effort to Collect Unpaid Taxes on Billions in Hidden Offshore Accounts:
Majority & Minority Staff Report, Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, S. Comm. on Homeland Security &
Governmental Affairs, 113th Cong. 61 (2014), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/REPORT%20%20OFFSHORE%20TAX%20EVASION%20(Feb%2026%202014,%208-20-14%20FINAL).pdf.
87
One of the authors of the Guyton et al. paper estimated in 2015 that 80 percent of global offshore wealth was
concealed from tax authorities. See Gabriel Zucman, The Hidden Wealth of Nations: The Scourge of Tax Havens 49
(2015). Notably, Zucman’s central estimate is lower than the lower bound in Guyton et al.’s sensitivity analysis (85
percent). See Guyton et al., supra note 26, at 20 tbl.1.
88
Id. at 21. The authors’ estimates do not include noncompliance through offshore hedge funds, which until
recently had very limited reporting obligations.
89
Id. at 15.
90
American Families Tax Compliance Agenda, supra note 3, at 4 tbl.1.
91
We have two main concerns about the $15 billion figure as an estimate for offshore underreporting in 2007.
First, Guyton et al. attribute to U.S. households approximately 19 percent of the world’s $5.6 trillion in “offshore
wealth” (i.e., wealth owned by a household in one country and held in another country). Yet U.S. households
account for much less than 19 percent of offshore wealth revealed by available data sources—only 3 percent of
foreign-owned fiduciary deposits in Swiss banks in the early 2000s and 7 percent of unique owners of shell
companies revealed in the Panama Papers leaks. Annette Alstadsæter, Niels Johannesen & Gabriel Zucman, Who
Owns the Wealth in Tax Havens? Macro Evidence and Implications for Global Inequality, 162 J. Pub. Econ. 89
(2018) (online appendix tbls. A3, A4). The only support for attributing 19 percent of global offshore wealth to U.S.
households comes from data on the ownership of foreign bank deposits in offshore tax havens. See Alstadsæter et
al., supra, at 94 & n.12. But the broad category of foreign bank deposits, which includes deposits held by
multinational corporations in foreign banks for legitimate business reasons, provides limited information on
household-level tax evasion.
Second, Guyton et al. use 2007 estimates for other parameters but then—without explanation—switch to
2006 rates of return. Guyton et al., supra note 26, at 20 & tbl.27. Since 2006 was a year of unusually strong market
performance, the choice has a significant upward effect on the authors’ ultimate estimate. We do not fault Guyton
et al. for declining to use rate-of-return data from 2007—a year when the S&P 500 total return was -1.4 percent.
Other sections of the Guyton et al. study use 2006 to 2013 as the period of analysis. If the authors had used 20062013 period, their estimate of the underreporting gap attributable to offshore income would decline from $15
billion to $7 billion. See id. at 20 tbl.1 & n.27; Swiss National Bank, Published Interest Rates for New Transactions,
https://bit.ly/2STLvD3 (last updated July 1, 2021) (indicating that the average interest rate on three-month term
deposits with a 100,000 Swiss franc minimum for 2006 through 2013 was 0.627 percent); S&P 500 Return
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households has fallen since 2007—not risen in step with income. Indeed, three of the authors
of the Guyton et al. paper emphasize in a subsequent comment that their estimates “reflect a
time before the [U.S. offshore tax] enforcement that began in 2008,” and they specifically
caution against “[m]apping the offshore estimates to today’s policy environment” without
more data.92
As the three authors note, the United States ramped up offshore enforcement efforts
dramatically starting in 2008. Since then, Justice Department investigations of financial
institutions in Switzerland, Israel, Lichtenstein, and the Caribbean have yielded settlements in
which institutions agreed to turn over the names of thousands of U.S. customers and pay
around $6 billion in aggregate penalties.93 From 2009 through 2018, more than 56,000 U.S.
taxpayers have entered the IRS’s Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program (OVDP), paying over
$11 billion in back taxes, interest, and penalties in order to avoid prosecution for tax evasion.94
The Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), enacted in 2010, almost certainly has
had a further impact on offshore evasion (beyond the effect of the Justice Department
investigations and the OVDP).95 FATCA imposes a 30 percent excise tax on payments to foreign
financial institutions unless they register with the IRS and provide extensive information about
their U.S. account holders. From 2014—the first year of implementation—through 2018, an
estimated 97 percent of all foreign financial firms with at least $100 million in assets and sales
have registered.96 The IRS’s deputy commissioner for services and enforcement stated in 2019
that “the implementation of FATCA has … made it much harder for U.S. taxpayers to hide assets
in offshore accounts and evade U.S. tax.”97
Calculator, with Dividend Reinvestment, DQYDJ (July 30, 2021), https://dqydj.com/sp-500-return-calculator
(indicating that the average annualized S&P 500 return from 2006 through 2013 was 6.737 percent).
92
Daniel Reck, Max Risch & Gabriel Zucman, Response to a Comment by Auten and Splinter on “Tax Evasion at the
Top of the Income Distribution: Theory and Evidence” 20 (July 21, 2021),
https://www.danreck.com/s/asresponse_full.pdf. Nonetheless, as recently as August 2021, Commissioner Rettig
continued to use the Guyton et al. estimate of offshore underreporting in 2007 to project the tax gap for tax year
2019. Letter from Charles P. Rettig, Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service, to Senator Elizabeth Warren 20 (Aug.
27, 2021),
https://www.warren.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Warren%20et%20al%20response%20to%20Warren%20082721.p
df.
93
See Laura Sanders, The IRS Is Still Coming for You, Offshore Tax Cheats, Wall St. J. (Sept. 14, 2018),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-irs-is-still-coming-for-you-offshore-tax-cheats-1536917401.
94
See Press Release, Internal Revenue Service, IRS to End Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program; Taxpayers with
Undisclosed Foreign Assets Urged to Come Forward Now (Mar. 13, 2018), https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/irs-toend-offshore-voluntary-disclosure-program-taxpayers-with-undisclosed-foreign-assets-urged-to-come-forwardnow; Press Release, Internal Revenue Service, IRS: Offshore Voluntary Compliance Program To End Sept. 28 (Sept.
4, 2018), https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/irs-offshore-voluntary-compliance-program-to-end-sept-28.
95
Pub. L. No. 97-117, 124 Stat. 71 (2010).
96
See Andrew Belnap, Jacob Thornock & Braden Williams, The Long Arm of the U.S. Tax Law:
Participation Rates and Costs related to Mandated Information Sharing (May 2019),
https://acis.pamplin.vt.edu/content/dam/acis_pamplin_vt_edu/research/2019/Belnap.pdf.
97
Letter from Kirsten B. Wielobob, Deputy Commissioner for Services & Enforcement, Internal Revenue Service, to
James R. McTigue, Director, Tax Issues, Strategic Issues Team, U.S. Government Accountability Office (Feb. 28,
2019), in U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO-19-180, Foreign Asset Reporting: Actions Needed to
Enhance Compliance Efforts, Eliminate Overlapping Requirements, and Mitigate Burdens on U.S. Persons Abroad
66 (Apr. 2019). The
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Some of the strongest evidence of the United States’ enforcement success comes from a
paper by Niels Johannesen, Patrick Langetieg, Daniel Reck, Max Risch, and Joel Slemrod, who
estimate on the basis of IRS administrative data that in 2009 alone, U.S. taxpayers disclosed
$100 billion of additional offshore wealth due to enforcement initiatives.98 As the authors
emphasize, the $100 billion estimate is pre-FATCA,99 which almost certainly had a further effect
on the portion of the underreporting gap attributable to offshore income. Commissioner Rettig,
in an article written while still in private practice, also cites data showing that the number of
foreign financial-account disclosures received by Treasury more than quadrupled between fiscal
year 2009 and fiscal year 2015—“to a large extent as a result of [Justice Department and IRS]
efforts.”100
To be sure, U.S. implementation of FATCA has not been seamless. For example, a 2018
report by the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration found that approximately 4.3
million out of 8.8 million FATCA records received from foreign financial institutions as of
September 2017 either did not have a taxpayer identification number or had an invalid
taxpayer identification number.101 A 2019 evaluation by the Government Accountability Office
concluded that “[d]ata quality and management issues have limited the effectiveness” of IRS
efforts to improve tax compliance using data collected under FATCA.102 Even so, neither the
TIGTA report nor the GAO evaluation implies that the combination of all the post-2008 offshore
enforcement efforts—including Justice Department actions and the IRS’s Offshore Voluntary
Disclosure Program as well as FATCA—cumulatively had zero effect on underreporting. In light
of the last dozen years’ experience, Treasury’s assumption that offshore underreporting has
increased in step with income growth seems surprising.
3. Cryptocurrency. The IRS’s official tax gap estimates are based on tax years that predate the remarkable rise in cryptocurrency. By 2019, the annual volume of cryptocurrency
transactions around the world reached an estimated $366 billion.103 (We use 2019 figures for
consistency with Treasury’s tax year 2019 projections; the volume of cryptocurrency
transactions increased in 2020.104) Roughly 30 percent of the global cryptocurrency market

98

See Niels Johannesen, Patrick Langetieg, Daniel Reck, Max Risch & Joel Slemrod, Taxing Hidden Wealth: The
Consequences of US Enforcement Initiatives on Evasive Foreign Accounts, 12 Am. Econ. J.: Econ. Policy 312 (2020).
99
Id. at 316.
100
See Charles P. Rettig, Why the Ongoing Problem with FBAR Compliance?, J. Tax Practice & Procedure, Aug-Sept.
2016, at 37, 42 n.3.
101
Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration, Despite Spending Nearly $380 Million, the Internal Revenue
Service Is Still Not Prepared to Enforce Compliance With the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, 2018-30-040, at
12 (July 5, 2018), https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2018reports/201830040fr.pdf.
102
Government Accountability Office, Foreign Asset Reporting: Actions Needed to Enhance Compliance Efforts,
Eliminate Overlapping Requirements, and Mitigate Burdens on U.S. Persons Abroad, GAO-19-180 (Apr. 2019),
gao.gov/assets/gao-19-180.pdf
103
Estimated Transaction Value (USD), Blockhain.com, https://www.blockchain.com/charts/estimated-transactionvolume-usd (last visited June 4, 2021). The market capitalization of all cryptocurrency is around $2 trillion, but an
increase in market capitalization would not give rise to tax liability without a transaction.
104
The increase was substantial, with approximately $631 billion of global volume in 2020. Id.
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appears to be U.S.-based,105 suggesting that approximately $110 billion in cryptocurrency
transactions in 2019 could be sourced to the United States.106
Use of cryptocurrency can contribute to the underreporting gap in two ways. First, a
purchaser of goods and services may pay in cryptocurrency, and the seller may fail to report the
value of the cryptocurrency payment as income. Second, a person who holds cryptocurrency
that has appreciated since acquisition may exchange her cryptocurrency for cash, other
cryptocurrency, or other property, and the person who disposes of her cryptocurrency at a gain
may fail to report that gain. Depending on the circumstances, exchanges of cryptocurrency may
generate ordinary income, short-term capital gain, or long-term capital gain (or,
correspondingly, losses). On the extreme assumption that all U.S.-attributable volume reflected
unreported income taxable at the top rate (40.8 percent), cryptocurrency would have added
approximately $48 billion to the 2019 underreporting gap.
The $48 billion figure should be treated as close to a theoretical upper bound for tax
year 2019—we expect that the true number is substantially lower. Large corporations that
accept cryptocurrency for retail transactions (e.g., Microsoft, Home Depot, Starbucks, and
Whole Foods107) almost certainly report those receipts. Even when cryptocurrency transactions
go unreported, the amount of unreported income generally will be less than the transaction
volume (e.g., an individual accepting cryptocurrency as payment for goods and services will
have theoretically deductible expenses; an individual selling cryptocurrency for cash will have a
cost basis in those coins). And not all cryptocurrency income is taxed at the top 40.8 percent
rate: some accrues to lower-bracket taxpayers, and some qualifies for lower long-term capital
gain rates. Moreover, some of the cryptocurrency tax gap may reflect unreported transactions
that previously would have taken the form of cash. Insofar as cryptocurrency reflects
substitution from cash, then a portion of the cryptocurrency tax gap is potentially included in
the IRS’s official tax gap estimate already.
The bipartisan infrastructure package passed by the Senate in August 2021 included
new reporting requirements for cryptocurrency transactions that will potentially require a wide
range of cryptocurrency market actors to file information returns.108 The Joint Committee on
Taxation estimated that these new requirements will raise $4.6 billion per year by 2031 (and
$28 billion over the entire fiscal year 2022-2031 period).109 The Joint Committee on Taxation
does not provide further detail on how it arrived at these estimates. However, the JCT
105

See Gertrude Chavez-Dreyfuss, U.S. Tax Liabilities for Crypto Currencies in 2017 Seen at $25 Billion, to Pressure
Bitcoin: Fundstrat, Reuters (Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-crypto-currencies-taxes/u-s-taxliabilities-for-crypto-currencies-in-2017-seen-at-25-billion-to-pressure-bitcoin-fundstrat-idUSKCN1HC29Y.
106
Cryptocurrency transactions can cross borders, so a country-by-country breakdown is necessarily imprecise.
Nonetheless, multiplying global transactional volume by the U.S. market share offers a rough estimate of the
maximum amount of gross income that conceivably could be attributable to cryptocurrency.
107
See Julie Iannuzzi, Crypto Guide: Companies Accepting Bitcoin and More, The Street (May 5, 2021),
https://www.thestreet.com/video/cryptocurrency-guide-companies-accepting-bitcoin.
108
Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, H.R. 3684, § 80603, 117th Cong., 1st Sess. (passed by the Senate Aug.
16, 2021).
109
Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, Estimated Revenue Effects of the Provisions in the Division H of an
Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to H.R. 3684, JCX-33-21, at 2 (Aug. 2, 2021),
https://www.jct.gov/publications/2021/jcx-33-21.
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estimates either reflect (a) a very pessimistic assessment of the efficacy of new reporting
requirements or (b) a view similar to ours regarding the magnitude of cryptocurrency-related
underreporting: billions per year—potentially tens of billions per year—but not enough to
explain a substantial portion of the delta between the IRS’s official tax gap estimate and
Commissioner Rettig’s $1 trillion figure.
4. Illegal Source Income. A recent Bureau of Economic Analysis study—combining data
from a variety of sources—estimated that four categories of illegal activity (drugs, prostitution,
gambling, and theft from businesses) added approximately $231 billion to nominal GDP in
2017, or $253 billion for 2019 if illegal activity grew with the rest of the economy.110 If all $253
billion represents income taxable at the overall average federal individual income and
employment tax rates, then illegal activity would add roughly $40 billion to the tax gap for
2019.111
As noted above, the IRS’s official tax gap estimates are explicitly limited to legal source
income.112 Although some underreporting attributable to illegal source income may be picked
up in the NRP nonetheless,113 the IRS’s official estimate by design omits a significant source of
difference between the amount of true tax and the amount actually paid. Note, though, that
illegal source income raises a very different set of enforcement challenges than, for example,
underreporting by large passthrough entities. Notwithstanding the success of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue—the IRS’s predecessor—in making the case against Al Capone nine decades
ago, the IRS probably should not be expected to take the lead in investigating the gamut of
non-tax crimes that give rise to taxable income
***
Our review of the evidence suggests that the IRS’s official tax gap estimate should not
be considered an upper bound or a lower bound on the difference between “true tax” and the
amount of tax that is actually paid. Details of the IRS’s methodology for estimating the tax
gap—in particular, the use of the DCE adjustment and the asymmetric treatment of
underreporting and overreporting—raise concerns about upward bias. On the other hand, the
potential underestimation of certain types of noncompliance—in particular, passthrough
underreporting and underreporting attributable to illegal source income—could result in
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Rachel Soloveichik, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Including Illegal Activity in the U.S. National Economic
Accounts (Mar. 2020), https://www.bea.gov/system/files/papers/WP2019-4_6.pdf. We adjust based on BEA’s
estimate of a 9.76 percent increase in nominal GDP from 2017 to 2019. See Bureau of Economic Analysis, National
Income and Product Accounts tbl.1.1.5 (last revised May 27, 2021),
https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?reqid=19&step=2#reqid=19&step=2&isuri=1&1921=survey.
111
Treasury estimates that the overall average federal individual income tax rate for 2019 was 8.9 percent and the
overall average payroll (employment) tax rate was 7.0 percent. See U.S. Department of the Treasury, Distribution
Table: 2019 001 Distribution of Families, Cash Income, and Federal Taxes under 2019 Current Law (Apr. 18, 2018),
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/131/Distribution-of-Tax-Burden-Current-Law-2019.pdf.
112
See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
113
For example, if an NRP examiner questions a taxpayer about a large check or deposit reflected on a bank
statement and the taxpayer acknowledges that the amount should be added to income, the examiner may never
know whether the ultimate source of the income was a legal or illegal activity.
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downward bias. In our view, knowing the exact size of the tax gap—an inherently subjective
quantity—is less important than understanding what the tax gap does and does not represent.
III.

Policy Implications

Clearing up the confusion about the tax gap and tax evasion can usefully inform tax
policy. Here, we highlight three concrete policy implications with relevance to current debates`.
A. The Tax Gap Should Not Be a Policy Target
The idea that the Congress and the IRS should aim to “shrink the tax gap” has gained
currency in tax policy circles in recent months. As noted above, Representative Ro Khanna and
Senator Elizabeth Warren have both introduced legislation that would set an explicit goal of
reducing the tax gap by one-third over the next decade.114 This sort of “tax gap targeting” raises
several serious concerns.
First, estimates of the tax gap are not nearly precise enough for a goal such as reducing
the net tax gap by one-third to be meaningful. As our analysis illustrates, methodological
choices—such as whether to use the DCE approach and how to treat overreporting—may affect
tax gap estimates as much as any changes in compliance rates. Or, for example, changes in the
experience and skill levels (and perhaps also the aggressiveness) of examiners who conduct
NRP audits may have large impacts on tax gap estimates, especially in light of the DCE method
described above.
Second, the time lag between the end of the relevant tax year and the publication of an
IRS tax gap estimate for that year is long—more than five years.115 Individuals can request a tax
return filing extension until October 15 of the following year; information returns are often not
ready to be matched to tax returns until early fall; audits can take several years to complete;
and only then can the researchers analyze the data and calculate the tax gap and its
components.116 The agency is currently seeking to accelerate that timeline through machine
learning techniques,117 but until it does, the tax gap will reflect tax policy and administration
from several years in the past. It remains to be seen, moreover, whether machine learning can
replicate the results of thorough in-person audits and accurately account for changes in
economic conditions, statutes and regulations, and IRS funding levels.

114

Stop CHEATERS Act, H.R. 1200, 117 Cong., 1st Sess. (Feb. 22, 2021); Restoring the IRS Act, S. 1788, 117th Cong.,
1st Sess. (May 24, 2021).
115
The IRS released its report for tax years 2011 to 2013 in September 2019. The agency aims to release its report
for tax years 2014 to 2016 in early 2022. See Letter from Charles P. Rettig, supra note 92, at 18.
116
For example, as of September 30, 2020, approximately 37 percent of exams of tax year 2018 individual returns
remained in process, as did 21 percent of exams of tax year 2017 returns and 4 percent of exams of tax year 2016
returns. See IRS Data Book 2020, at 36-38 tbl.17. These figures primarily reflect timelines for operational audits,
most of which are conducted on a correspondence basis, and therefore may not account for the unique challenges
of more thorough NRP exams.
117
See Letter from Charles P. Rettig, supra note 92, at 18.
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A third reason is, perhaps, counterintuitive. President Biden has called for an increase in
the IRS budget to hire more examiners and to fund upgrades to its computer systems and data
analytics. Those steps are critical to improving audit selection and execution. All other things
equal, we would expect the tax gap to narrow due to the deterrence effect of IRS capacity
improvements. But those improvements also may enable examiners—and in particular, those
assigned to the NRP studies—to detect noncompliance that had previously gone unnoticed and
not accounted for in the estimates of the tax gap (even after DCE adjustments). While such
improvements in detection would be a positive development, they would also cause estimates
of the tax gap to rise.
Fourth, much of the tax gap lies outside the IRS’s control. For example, Congress may
enact changes to the partnership tax rules that further increase their complexity and increase
the likelihood of evasion, aggressive reporting positions, and confusion.118 Or to take another
example, if the use of cryptocurrency continues to grow exponentially, the tax gap may
increase as well because of the unique challenges of tracking cryptocurrency transactions.
Holding the IRS to account for trends beyond its influence is not likely to be an effective
strategy for sustaining long-term support for the agency.
Fifth, setting issues of measurement and control aside, the fact that a policy narrows the
tax gap does not necessarily make it worthwhile. For example, the IRS could narrow the tax gap
by rescinding the 1974 revenue ruling that requires S corporations to pay reasonable
compensation to active shareholders.119 That would serve to reduce “true tax”—and thus the
difference between true tax and the amount actually paid—but it would be a step backward for
tax enforcement. Or the IRS might use its authority to release tax levies less often (in effect,
garnishing more wages and seizing more property from individuals with tax debts). That would
reduce the net tax gap, but it would be at odds with Congress’s instruction to take account of
economic hardship in collection.
Finally, setting the tax gap, in isolation, as a performance goal ignores the costs incurred
in tax enforcement. At current levels of noncompliance, there is sufficient “low-hanging fruit”
to ensure that increasing audits would achieve a positive return on investment.120 But tackling
some of the most difficult compliance challenges may be very costly relative to the amount of
owed taxes that could be recouped from noncompliant taxpayers. Of course, even if the
monetary returns to investment are very low or even negative, there may still be reasons to
expend the funds—if solely to demonstrate commitment to enforcing the tax code or as a way
to gain information that could improve the IRS’s efforts in the future. But setting the tax gap as
118

For example, the “opportunity zone” provisions added by the December 2017 tax law create new complexities,
gray areas, and opportunities for aggressive planning. See, e.g., Jason Watkins, Value of Third-Party Assistance in
Opportunity Zones Compliance, 12 Novogradac J. of Tax Credits no. 8 (2021),
https://www.novoco.com/periodicals/articles/value-third-party-assistance-opportunity-zones-compliance (noting
that opportunity zone businesses “are required to meet myriad complex tests” and that “there are a number of
potentially costly traps for an unwary [fund]”).
119
Rev. Rul. 74-44, 1974-1 C.B. 287.
120
See Janet Holtzblatt & Jamie McGuire, Effect of Recent Reductions in the Internal Revenue Service’s
Appropriations on Returns on Investment, The IRS Research Bulletin: Proceedings of the 2019 IRS/TPC Research
Conference, Publication 1500 (June 2020).

26

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3934044

the sole goal ignores a careful consideration of the monetary costs of enforcement as well as
the nonmonetary benefits of enforcement actions.
To be sure, virtually any quantitative target for IRS performance raises the risk of
perverse incentives. Congressman Khanna’s Stop CHEATERS Act, for example, would set explicit
targets for audit rates for high-income individual taxpayers and large corporations based on
reported income (e.g., 50 percent audit coverage for individual returns with reported total
income of $10 million or more).121 One obvious problem with targeting audits on the basis of
reported income is that it may incentivize taxpayers to underreport income, thereby reducing
their audit risk. Meanwhile, evaluating the IRS on the basis of the revenue yield from audits
might incentivize the agency to pursue assessments that the tax laws do not warrant. And
focusing only on measures that simultaneously reduce the tax gap and raise revenues may
neglect tax simplification proposals that would make it easier for taxpayers to comply with the
tax code and for the IRS to effectively administer the law without reliance on costly audits—but
also reduce revenues.
Ultimately, no single measure will allow lawmakers to determine whether the IRS is
fulfilling its mission to “enforce the law with integrity and fairness to all.” The tax gap, though,
is particularly ill-suited for that purpose. And if policymakers do pursue tax gap targeting, they
should do so with a clear understanding of what exactly tax gap measures capture.
Importantly, we are not disputing the need for the IRS to estimate and analyze the tax
gap or for policymakers to pay close attention to those findings. The underreporting estimates
without the DCE correction provide a realistic perspective on the amount that could potentially
be collected from increasing the number of audits if the IRS thoroughly audited 100 percent of
filers using the tools and procedures available to examiners at the time of the study. (Note that
this figure—sometimes described as the “audit gap”122—would be approximately one-third of
the IRS’s DCE-adjusted estimate of the individual income tax underreporting gap.)
Moreover, tax gap studies not only identify areas of noncompliance but can also provide
insights into solutions. For example, estimates of noncompliance with child-related tax benefits
not only indicated a problem area, but in-depth analysis of those compliance data revealed how
the complexity of family structure contributes to erroneous claims.123 In the past, that type of

121

Stop CHEATERS Act, H.R. 1200, 117 Cong., 1st Sess. (introduced Feb. 22, 2021),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/1200.
122
See supra note 18 (describing Ireland’s approach).
123
John Szilagyi, a compliance researcher at the IRS in the 1980s, uncovered millions of nonexistent dependents,
which led to requirements that taxpayers provide Social Security numbers for each dependent claimed on a tax
return. See Stephen Dubner & Steven Levitt, Filling in the Tax Gap, N.Y. Times (Apr. 2, 2006),
https://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/02/magazine/filling-in-the-tax-gap.html. For discussion of how analysis of the
1988 Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (the precursor to the NRP) led to changes in the eligibility
criteria for the earned income tax credit and other child-related tax benefits, see Janet Holtzblatt, Administering
Refundable Tax Credits: Lessons from the EITC Experience, 84 Proceedings of the Annual Conference on Taxation
180 (1991), and Janet Holtzblatt & Janet McCubbin, Issues Affecting Low-Income Filers, in The Crisis in Tax
Administration 48 (Henry Aaron & Joel Slemrod eds., 2004). Further analysis of the impact of complicated family
structures is found in a working paper by Kara Leibel, Emily Lin, & Janet McCubbin, Social Welfare Consequences of
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analysis has resulted in both simplification legislation and new enforcement tools. There is a
lesson to be learned from that experience: Inclusion of more audits of passthrough entities in
the NRP studies could similarly provide insight into the complexity of business structures and
help shape tax legislation and tax administration in ways that would improve tax compliance.
B. Congress Must Provide the IRS with Sustained Support
The IRS clearly requires more resources in order to fulfill its mission irrespective of the
distinction between the tax gap and tax evasion. Nonetheless, the distinction underscores both
the magnitude of the agency’s challenge as well as the need for sustained support from
Congress.
The IRS’s recent struggles are well-documented but worth recounting:
•

Congress has reduced the IRS’s budget by 23 percent in inflation-adjusted terms since
2010,124 even as the total number of returns has risen.125 At the same time, the agency’s
responsibilities have increased considerably, including as a result of the Affordable Care Act
of 2010 and FATCA (discussed above).

•

From fiscal year 2010 to fiscal year 2020, the number of IRS revenue agents—the
employees who typically conduct audits—declined by 44 percent.126 Of particular concern,
the IRS over that period lost a large number of experienced employees who handle complex
cases—resulting in a “skills gap” that exacerbates the tax gap.127 As Commissioner Rettig
put it, the agency “essentially lost an entire generation of IRS employees” and could not
replace them due to a hiring freeze that persisted for most of the past decade.128

•

The overall audit rate has dropped from an already-low 0.9 percent in fiscal year 2010 to
less than 0.4 percent in fiscal year 2019,129 and the audit rate for individual income

EITC Qualifying Children Noncompliance (U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Off. Of Tax Analysis, Working Paper 120, Jan.
2020), https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/131/WP-120.pdf.
124
See The Effect of Tax Enforcement on Revenues: Statement of Janet Holtzblatt, Senior Fellow, Urban Institute,
before the Select Revenue Measures Subcommittee & Oversight Subcommittee, Ways & Means Committee, U.S.
House of Representatives: Minding the Tax Gap: Improving Tax Administration for the 21st Century (June 10,
2021).
125
Compare IRS Data Book 2010, at 4 tbl.2 (230.409 million returns in fiscal year 2010), with IRS Data Book 2020, at
4 tbl.2 (240.161 million returns in fiscal year 2020).
126
IRS Data Book 2010, at 67 tbl.30 (14,588 revenue agents at close of fiscal year 2010), with IRS Data Book 2020,
at 4 tbl.2, 46 tbl.18 (253,035,393 returns filed in calendar year 2019 and 509,917 examinations in fiscal year 2020)
127
See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-19-176, Internal Revenue Service: Strategic Human Capital
Management is Needed to Address Serious Risks to IRS’s Mission (Mar. 2019), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao19-176.pdf.
128
Jory Heckman, IRS Commissioner: Aging Workforce ‘Lost an Entire Generation’ to Hiring Freeze, Federal News
Network (Apr. 10, 2019), https://federalnewsnetwork.com/workforce/2019/04/irs-commissioner-aging-workforcelost-an-entire-generation-to-hiring-freeze.
129
See IRS Data Book 2010, at 22 tbl.9a; IRS Data Book 2019, at 45 tbl.17b.

28

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3934044

taxpayers with total reported positive income over $1 million has fallen even more
dramatically—from 8.4 percent in fiscal year 2010 to 2.4 percent in fiscal year 2019.130
•

For individual and business income taxpayers, the IRS still retains all tax data on an IBM
mainframe that dates back to the Eisenhower administration.131

The Biden administration’s proposal for $79 billion in IRS funding over the next
decade—on top of the agency’s base appropriations—will help to heal the wounds inflicted by
the prior decade of budget cuts. But this paper’s focus on the gray areas between
noncompliance and compliance helps to highlight just how hard it will be for even an
adequately resourced IRS to enforce complex laws against sophisticated taxpayers.
Consider again the example of passthrough entities: 44 percent of partnership field
audits and 33 percent of S corporation field audits closed in fiscal year 2010 resulted in “no
change.”132 A no-change outcome after an audit indicates either (a) that the IRS is failing to
focus its examination resources on noncompliant returns or (b) that examiners are failing to
detect noncompliance. In other words, even before the last decade of budget cuts, the IRS
struggled to enforce the tax laws against partnerships. Simply restoring the IRS to fiscal year
2010 funding levels will not solve the problem of passthrough-entity tax enforcement, because
all was not well a decade ago either.
Improving enforcement against passthrough entities and other sophisticated taxpayers
(such as high-income individuals and large corporations for whom roughly half of
recommended additional taxes are reversed after review and appeal) will therefore require a
multipronged strategy. First, the IRS needs more money, without which it cannot hire
additional revenue agents and other enforcement personnel to replace the thousands who
have left in recent years and provide them with up-to-date technology to support long-overdue
improvements in the detection and selection of audits. Second, the IRS needs time to train new
revenue agents in complex areas of tax law and in audit techniques tailored to complex
returns.133 Training new staff usually requires experienced IRS employees to reduce their audit
activity to conduct the necessary instruction. And even after new employees are hired and
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IRS Data Book 2010 reports an audit coverage rate of 8.4 percent for individual income tax returns reporting
total positive income of $1 million or more. IRS Data Book 2010, at 22 tbl.9a. IRS Data Book 2020 does not report
fiscal-year audit coverage rates, but it indicates that the IRS closed 10,890 exams of individual income tax returns
reporting total positive income of $1 million or more, and 634,058 such returns were filed in the most recent tax
year for which data are available (2018). See IRS Data Book 2020, at 36 tbl.17, 46 tbl.18.
131
Government Accountability Office, GAO-16-696T, Information Technology: Federal Agencies Need to Address
Aging Legacy Systems 17 (May 25, 2016).
132
IRS Data Book 2010, at 22-23 tbl.9a. Those figures remained high throughout the decade. See, e.g., IRS Data
Book 2019, at 45 tbl.17b (41 percent no-change rate for partnership field audits and 31 percent no-change rate for
S corporation field audits in fiscal year 2019).
133
The IRS may cut short the requisite training time in some cases by hiring some mid-career professionals who
already have amassed significant subject-matter expertise, but competing with private-sector salaries will be a
challenge for the agency.
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trained, it will take several years before the revenue impacts are fully felt, because complex
audits take years to complete.134
Moreover, Congress’s responsibility for the problem of tax noncompliance extends
beyond long-term IRS funding levels. As long as Congress continues to write tax laws that leave
large legal and factual gray areas, sophisticated taxpayers will continue to exploit those gray
areas. The IRS—however well-resourced it might be—will struggle to fight back. For that
reason, investments in tax enforcement must be complements to, not substitutes for, legal
reform. We end by considering legal changes that would effectively address areas of persistent
noncompliance.
C. Changes to Substantive Law
Congress cannot realistically eliminate gray areas from the tax laws entirely. However,
Congress can constrict zones of ambiguity that arise because of arbitrary or poorly designed tax
laws. We end by considering several such reforms, paralleling the discussion of ambiguities in
Section I.
•

Valuation of illiquid assets. Although illiquid-asset valuations will always pose compliance
challenges, Congress can reduce the frequency and stakes of these disputes. For example,
Congress can simply prohibit Roth IRAs—or all IRAs—from investing in non-publicly traded
assets (as the IRS itself confirmed, in a 2019 GAO report, would remove an obstacle to the
IRS’s efforts to pursue IRA noncompliance ).135 That change would eliminate the need to
establish a fair market value for illiquid assets sold to an IRA (since illiquid assets could not
be sold to an IRA). Likewise, Congress can limit the charitable contribution deduction for
gifts of non-publicly traded assets to the value of liquidation proceeds received by the
charity upon sale, as recently proposed by Senator Angus King (I-Maine) and Senator
Charles Grassley (R-Iowa).136 Verifying the taxpayer’s claimed deduction would then be a
mechanical process, whereas the status quo requires a revenue agent to spend hours
figuring out what a specific asset (e.g., a limited partnership interest in a particular private
equity fund) was really worth at the exact moment of contribution.137

134

For example, at the end of fiscal year 2019 (September 30, 2019), approximately 17 percent of S corporation
audits, 20 percent of partnership audits, 35 percent of the highest-income individual audits (positive income of $10
million or more), and 59 percent of the largest C corporation audits (balance sheet of $20 billion or more) from tax
year 2015 remained in process. See IRS Data Book 2019, at 38 tbl.17a.
135
GAO-15-16, supra note 31, at 52.
136
See Accelerating Charitable Efforts (ACE) Act, S. 1981, § 2, 117th Cong., 1st Sess. (2021). The King-Grassley
proposal would apply only to contributions to donor advised funds, though there is a strong argument for applying
the rule more broadly.
137
The problem of private-company restricted stock received in exchange for services is somewhat more
complicated. Congress allows employees to make an election under section 83(b) to include the fair market value
of restricted stock in ordinary income prior to vesting, thus allowing the employees to treat subsequent
appreciation as capital gain. I.R.C. § 83(b). In practice, this provision allows start-up employees to claim very low
valuations at the time of the 83(b) election and then pay tax at preferential rates when they sell their stock (e.g.,
after an IPO). See Ronald J. Gilson & David M. Schizer, Understanding Venture Capital Structure: A Tax Explanation
for Convertible Preferred Stock, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 874, 899 (2003) (noting that the IRS has been unsuccessful in
contesting low valuations). Meanwhile, employees who receive stock options rather than stock cannot make an
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•

Business vs. personal expenses. At times, Congress has responded to the inherent
ambiguity of the business/personal distinction by imposing Solomonic limits on the
deductibility of certain borderline expenses. For example, the Tax Reform Act of 1986
capped the deductibility of business meals at 80 cents for every $1 of food and beverage
expenses (with exceptions).138 Congress in 1993 lowered the cap further to 50 cents on the
$1.139 The 50-cents-on-the-dollar rule stanches the revenue loss from a 100-cents-on-thedollar deduction that the IRS is unable to police. As part of the December 2020 Covid-19
relief package, however, Congress allowed a 100-cents-on-the-dollar deduction for calendar
years 2021 and 2022 with respect to business meals in restaurants.140 The motivation for
the change was to provide relief to the restaurant industry; another predictable result is to
widen the underreporting gap. Congress can instead subsidize the restaurant industry in any
number of ways that do not saddle the IRS with a significant enforcement burden. For other
expenses that blur the business/personal line, Congress can adopt prophylactic rules like
the 50-cents-on-the-dollar business meals deduction cap in order to lower the stakes of
misreporting.141

•

Employee vs. independent contractor. The line between employees and independent
contractors creates tax enforcement challenges largely because Congress has established
arbitrary distinctions in tax treatment based on employment status. For example, it is
unclear why an independent contractor should be eligible for a 20 percent qualified
business income deduction while an employee doing substantively similar work is not, or
why an individual who earns income both as an employee and an independent contractor
should thereby gain access to additional tax-preferred retirement savings opportunities.
Congress can ease the IRS’s enforcement burden by eliminating non-employee
preferences—for example, by repealing the section 199A deduction and by establishing
uniform limits on contributions to tax-preferred retirement plans. Note again that repealing

83(b) election unless the option has “a readily ascertainable fair market value” (i.e., unless the option is actively
traded on an established market). See I.R.C. § 83(e)(3); Treas. Reg. § 1.83-7(b)(1). One possible reform would be to
extend the “readily ascertainable fair market value” rule to restricted stock (i.e., employees would not be able to
make a section 83(b) election unless the property in question had a readily ascertainable fair market value).
138
Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 142(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2119.
139
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13209, 107 Stat. 312, 469.
140
See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, Pub. L. No. 116-260, § 210.
141
Vehicle-expense misreporting lends itself to a prophylactic solution of this sort. In a study of tax year 2001
returns, the Governmental Accountability Office estimated that 46 percent of sole-proprietor returns include an
error with respect to car and truck expenses, and these errors accounted for approximately 8 percent of the soleproprietor underreporting gap. Government Accountability Office, GAO-07-1014, Tax Gap:
A Strategy for Reducing the Gap Should Include Options for Addressing Sole Proprietor Noncompliance 36 tbl.3
(July 2007), https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-07-1014. In the past, Congress has responded to the problem of
vehicle-expense misreporting by setting dollar caps on the depreciation deductions that taxpayers can claim with
respect to passenger vehicles. These dollar caps reflect the reality that the IRS cannot effectively monitor
misreporting of vehicle expenses when taxpayers use their vehicles for both business and personal purposes. As
part of the December 2017 tax law, though, Congress raised the dollar limits on passenger-vehicle depreciation
deductions significantly (from a total of $8,260 over the first two years to $26,000, indexed for inflation). See Staff
of the Joint Committee on Taxation, JCS-1-18, General Explanation of Public Law 115-97, at 128-30 (2018). This
change is a recipe for increasing the underreporting gap. Congress took a tax benefit that the IRS already unable to
enforce effectively and then dramatically expanded the benefit.
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the section 199A deduction would not necessarily reduce the measured tax gap, because it
would increase the amount of true tax owed on sole-proprietor and passthrough income
subject to high noncompliance rates. Repealing section 199A would, though, raise revenue
and reallocate tax burdens in a more equitable manner, which are more important goals
than reducing the measured tax gap.142
•

Partnership special allocations. For years, commentators have called on Congress to
abolish partnership special allocations and to require partnerships to allocate tax items in
proportion to capital interests.143 In effect, this proposal would align the treatment of
partnerships with the treatment of S corporations, which must allocate items in proportion
to their shareholders’ stockholdings. A more modest proposal would prohibit special
allocations only among related partners.144 The more modest proposal would, at the very
least, prevent some of the most abusive partnership special allocations (e.g., when a
partnership whose partners are a taxable individual and that individual’s tax-exempt splitinterest trust allocates deductions to the taxable individual and ordinary-income items to
the trust).

•

Reasonable compensation. The policy responses to the S corporation “reasonable
compensation” problem are straightforward. First, Congress should apply the selfemployment tax to the distributive-share income of active S corporation shareholders.
Second, as suggested above, Congress should eliminate section 199A. Encouragingly, the
Biden administration’s fiscal year 2022 budget includes a proposal to extend selfemployment tax to active S corporation shareholders with adjusted gross income over
$400,000.145 Even under the administration’s proposal, though, taxpayers—including, it
appears, many with AGI over $400,000—will have opportunities to reduce employment and
self-employment tax by understating compensation.146 And the administration’s budget

142

Among other issues, section 199A gives rise to difficult line-drawing questions regarding the definitions of
various professional fields (health, law, consulting, etc.) that are excluded from the deduction when a taxpayer’s
income exceeds a certain threshold. These questions (e.g., which services do or don’t require “skills unique to the
creation of performing arts,” see Treas. Reg. § 199A-5(b)(3)(vi)) result in similarly situated taxpayers paying
significantly different amounts simply because they had different tax advisers or different degrees of risk aversion.
143
See, e.g., Mark P. Gergen, Reforming Subchapter K: Special Allocations, 46 Tax L. Rev. 1 (1990).
144
See Cauble & Polsky, supra note 39. For a proposal along these lines, see Press Release, U.S. Senate Committee
on Finance, Wyden Unveils Proposal To Close Loopholes Allowing Wealthy Investors, Mega-Corporations To Use
Partnerships To Avoid Paying Tax (Sept. 10, 2021), https://www.finance.senate.gov/chairmans-news/wydenunveils-proposal-to-close-loopholes-allowing-wealthy-investors-mega-corporations-to-use-partnerships-to-avoidpaying-tax.
145
See FY 2022 Greenbook, supra note 45, at 66-67.
146
The Greenbook is not crystal-clear with regard to the treatment of distributions to active shareholders of S
corporations. At one point, the Greenbook says that “for taxpayers with adjusted gross income in excess of
$400,000, the definition of net investment tax would be amended to include gross income and gain from any
trades or businesses that is not otherwise subject to employment taxes.” FY 2022 Greenbook, supra note 45, at 66.
Several paragraphs later, the Greenbook provides a formula for determining the portion of S corporation
distributions subject to self-employment tax. Under the formula:
[T]he taxpayer would sum (a) ordinary business income derived from S corporations for which the owner
materially participates in the trade or business, and (b) ordinary business income derived from either
limited partnership interests or interests in LLCs that are classified as partnerships to the extent a limited
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leaves in place the section 199A deduction, thus preserving (and, indeed, expanding147) the
income tax incentive for S corporation shareholders to understate compensation.148
These examples illustrate the range of cases in which substantive legal change can
accomplish in one fell swoop what would otherwise take thousands of hours of audit work and
potentially years of litigation. More ambitious reforms—such as a long-due overhaul of the

partner or LLC member materially participates in its partnership’s or LLC’s trade or business (this sum
referred to as the “potential SECA income”). Beginning in 2022, the additional income that would be
subject to SECA tax would be the lesser of (i) the potential SECA income, and (ii) the excess over $400,000
of the sum of the potential SECA income, wage income subject to FICA under current law, and 92.35
percent of self-employment income subject to SECA tax under current law.
Id. at 67.
Consider an active shareholder of an S corporation with $600,000 of S corporation income who
characterizes $100,000 as wages and $500,000 as a distribution. The formula would seem to imply that she is
subject to self-employment tax on $200,000 (i.e., $500,000 of potential SECA income + $100,000 of wages –
$400,000). In other words, she has avoided employment and self-employment tax on $300,000 by paying herself a
wage of $100,000 rather than $600,000.
What complicates this analysis is the earlier statement that for taxpayers with adjusted gross income over
$400,000, all gross income and gain from a trade or business that is not otherwise subject to employment tax will
be subject to the 3.8 percent net investment income tax. That earlier statement would seem to suggest a net
investment income tax cliff at AGI of $400,000; it is unclear whether the administration intended to suggest that.
147
The administration’s proposal to raise the top marginal rate to 39.6 percent would increase the income tax
benefit of understating compensation because the difference between the marginal tax rate on non-QBI and QBI
for top earners would rise from 7.4 percent (i.e., 20 percent x 37 percent) to 7.92 percent (i.e., 20 percent x 39.6
percent).
148
A similar issue arises in the partnership context. The definition of “net earnings from self-employment income”
for purposes of the self-employment tax specifically excludes “the distributive share of any item of income or loss
of a limited partner, as such, other than guaranteed payments … to that partner for services actually rendered to
or on behalf of the partnership to the extent that those payments are established to be in the nature of
remuneration for those services.” I.R.C. § 1402(a)(13). This raises the question: Can a limited partner who provides
services to the partnership receive reasonable compensation, in the form of a guaranteed payment, for services to
the partnership and then claim exemption from self-employment tax for her distributive share of partnership
profits?
Treasury and the IRS issued proposed regulations in 1997 that treat all partners as general partners for
self-employment tax purposes if they participate in the partnership’s trade or business for more than 500 hours
during the partnership’s taxable year. See Prop. Treas. Reg. 1.1402(a)-2(h)(2)(iii), 62 Fed. Reg. 1702, 1704 (Jan. 13,
1997). Although the IRS has not finalized the proposed regulations, the Tax Court has adopted the proposed
regulation’s view. See Renkemeyer, Campbell & Weaver, LLP v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 137, 150 (2011) (“The
legislative history of section 1402(a)(13) does not support a holding that Congress contemplated excluding
partners who performed services for a partnership in their capacity as partners (i.e., acting in the manner of selfemployed persons), from liability for self-employment taxes.”). The result in Renkemeyer has drawn criticism from
practitioners. See, e.g., James R. Browne, Can LLC Members Avoid Self-Employment Tax on LLC Profits?, 171 Tax
Notes Federal 725 (May 3, 2021) (arguing that limited partners and LLC managing members are exempt from selfemployment tax on distributive-share income over and above reasonable compensation). Treasury under the
Obama administration acknowledged that the issue was ambiguous. See U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, General
Explanations of the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2017 Revenue Proposals 169 (Feb. 2016),
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/general-Explanations-FY2017.pdf. The FY 2022
Greenbook notes that “[s]ome partners who might more accurately be considered general partners and some LLC
members avoid SECA by claiming the treatment of limited partners.” FY 2022 Greenbook, supra note 45, at 65.
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partnership tax rules—deserve a place on the tax compliance agenda too.149 To be clear, we
suggest these substantive legal changes as additions to—not replacements for—the increased
funding that the Biden administration has proposed. But a better-resourced IRS can only do so
much to close the tax gap if lawmakers still leave the agency with an impossible job.
Conclusion
This paper has sought to illustrate both what the tax gap is and what it is not. It is not a
measure of tax evasion; its contours are not always clear; and it is not a sensible policy target.
The tax gap is, however, one of several indications of deep problems in the U.S. federal tax
system, which allows well-advised taxpayers to avoid paying their fair share by exploiting a
variety of loopholes and legal ambiguities. An adequately funded IRS is a necessary but not
sufficient condition for addressing these deep problems. Congress must provide the IRS with
more enforcement resources—but also with laws that make the agency’s enforcement
challenge tractable.

149

See, e.g., Monte A. Jackel, Is It (Finally) Time? Reforming Subchapter K, Tax Notes (Mar. 29, 2021),
https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-federal/partnerships-and-other-passthrough-entities/it-finally-timereforming-subchapter-k/2021/03/29/3k6c2; U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, supra note 144.
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Table 1
Tax Gap, By Source
Averages, 2011 - 2013

Nonfiling Gap
Individual income tax
Employment tax
Corporate income tax1
Estate tax
Underreporting Gap
Individual income tax
Employment tax
Self-employment tax
FICA and unemployment tax
Corporate income tax
Small corporations (less than $10 million of assets)
Large corporations (more than $10 million of assets)
Estate tax
Underpayment Gap
Individual income tax
Employment tax
Corporate income tax
Estate tax
Gross Tax Gap

Amount
(billions of dollars)
39
31
6
n.a.
2
352
245
69
45
25
37
26
11
1
50
38
6
5
*
441

Share of Gross Tax Gap
8.8
7.0
1.4
n.a.
0.5
79.8
55.6
15.6
10.2
5.7
8.4
5.9
2.5
0.2
11.3
8.6
1.4
1.1
*
100

Addendum
Enforcement Revenue and Other Late Payments
60
Individual income tax
43
Employment tax
5
Corporate income tax
10
Estate tax
2
Net Tax Gap
381
Source: Internal Revenue Service, Tax Gap Estimates for Tax Years 2011-2013, Publication 1415 (Sept. 2019).
1

Not estimated
* Less than $0.5 billion or 0.5 percent.
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Table 2
Individual Income Tax Underreporting Tax Gap, By Source
Averages, 2011 - 2013

Amount
(billions of dollars)
245

Net Misreporting
Percentage1
18

Share of Individual
Income Tax
Underreporting Tax
Gap
100

Individual Income Tax Underreporting Tax Gap
Substantial Information Reporting and
Withholding
9
1
Wages, salaries, and tips
9
1
Substantial Information Reporting
12
5
Interest income
*
1
Dividend income
1
5
State income tax refunds
1
12
Pensions and annuities
5
3
Unemployment compensation
*
7
Taxable Social Security benefits
4
11
Some Information Reporting
36
17
Partnership, S-corporations, estate and
trust, etc.
19
11
Alimony income
**
**
Capital gains
17
23
Short-term capital gains
7
24
Long-term capital gains
10
15
Little or No Information Reporting
109
55
Form 4797 income
2
36
Other income
16
42
Nonfarm proprietor income
68
56
Farm income
6
62
Rents and royalties
17
51
Other Taxes
1
3
2
Unallocated Marginal Effects
10
n.a.
Adjustments, Deductions, and exemptions
20
5
Total Credits
42
38
Filing Status
5
n.a.
Source: Internal Revenue Service, Tax Gap Estimates for Tax Years 2011-2013, Publication 1415 (Sept. 2019).

4
4
5
*
1
*
2
*
2
15
8
**
7
3
4
45
1
6
28
2
7
1
4
8
17
2

1

The net misreporting percentage is the net misreported amount divided by the sum of the absolute values of the amounts that
should have been reported, expressed as a percentage.
2
The marginal tax rate used to estimate the tax gap associated with an income line item is calculated holding all other line items
at their reported amounts. The difference between the total individual income tax underreporting tax gap and the sum of
the individual line item tax gaps is the unallocated marginal effects.
* Less than $0.5 billion or $0.5 percent.
**Estimate is based on a very small sample size. Estimated tax gap is less than $0.5 billion and net misreporting percentage is less
than 0.5 percent.
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Table 3
Internal Revenue Service's and Treasury Department's Estimates of Tax Gap, 2011-2013 and 2019
($ Billions)
IRS
Treasury Department
Tax Gap Component
Average, 2011-2013
Base, 20191
Adjusted Base, 20192
Gross Tax Gap
441
584
630
Nonfiling Tax Gap
39
52
52
Underreporting Tax Gap
352
466
512
Underpayment Tax Gap
50
66
66
Enforcement Revenues and Other Late Payments
60
76
Net Tax Gap
381
508
Source: U.S. Department of the Treasury, The American Families Plan Tax Compliance Agenda (May 2021).

76
554

1

Treasury's base projection for 2019 assumes compliance rates, by income type, are unchanged since the 2011 to 2013 period and
adjusted for income growth.
2
Treasury added $46 billion to account for underreporting of income from passthrough entities and offshore assets. The adjustment
was based on estimates by Guyton et al (2021) of the amount of unreported taxes attributable to those sources that had
not been included in the IRS annual estimates of the tax gap over the period from 2006 through 2013 and adjusted
for income growth.
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